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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the actions the U.S. military should 
take to ensure the next time it is called upon to provide a campaign strategy to 
the President, the U.S. military does not repeat the shortfalls of 9/15/2001, which 
called for a Direct Approach against an irregular adversary, Al Qaeda.  The 
thesis presents a Game Theory analysis of Toft’s “Strategic Interaction Theory” 
to develop an optimal strategy for conducting future asymmetric conflicts. It finds 
the optimal strategy is to be equally capable of either a Direct or Indirect 
Approach and to employ whichever approach the adversary is employing.  The 
thesis then reviews U.S. military operations between 1947 and 2001 and finds 
that 208 of the 210 known engagements optimally required a U.S. Indirect 
Approach.  Despite the overwhelming preponderance of indirect action during 
this period, an assessment of the U.S. military educational system that produced 
the military uniformed leaders at the time of the 9/11 attacks shows it focused on 
the Direct Approach, rendering these leaders ill-prepared to advise the President 
on 9/15.  The thesis concludes with recommendations for future U.S. military 
preparations for asymmetric warfare, calling for an equally balanced education of 
U.S. officers in Direct and Indirect Approach strategies. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
On September 15th, 2001, three days after the September 11th attacks, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, presented the 
National Security Council with three Department of Defense developed Courses 
of Action for a retaliatory strategy against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. All three plans called for direct action against these non-state, 
irregular forces and while presenting General Shelton admitted the inadequacy of 
the plans. How is it possible that the best strategy the uniformed leaders of the 
U.S. military could propose was a direct approach strategy against an indirect 
approach strategy-employing adversary?   
This thesis examines this question through a number of lenses.  First, it 
offers a general analysis using game theory to analyze the work of Ivan Arreguín-
Toft, in How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.1  Next, the 
conclusion drawn from this analysis is compared to the organizational history of 
the Department of Defense and the U.S War Colleges’ education of the senior 
uniformed military leaders responsible for the plan presented at the NSC meeting 
on 9/15. 
The key findings, in this thesis, are:  
1. The optimal mixed strategy for the U.S. military is: 
a. To possess an equal capacity to conduct either a Direct 
Approach strategy or Indirect Approach strategy 
b. To force or allow the adversary to commit the first strategic 
move and respond with the same approach strategy being 
employed by the adversary. 
                                            
1 Ivan Arreguín-Toft. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.  New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
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2. The U.S. military must institute a curriculum within the U.S. military 
officer professional education program that equally balances Direct 
and Indirect Approach strategy foci.  
3. The military recommendations presented on 9/15 were inadequate 
strategies for responding to the 9/11 attacks because:  
a. The recommendation did not respond with the same 
approach strategy being employed by the adversary 
(Indirect), who had committed the first strategic move  
b. The U.S. military did not possess an equal capacity to 
conduct a Direct Approach strategy and Indirect Approach 
strategy, namely because… 
c. The men responsible for leading the U.S. military and 
recommending strategy to the President were not products 
of an officer professional education program with an 
education that equally balanced Direct and Indirect 
Approach strategy foci. 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter I examines the 9/15 meeting and 
the U.S. military’s strategy orientation, then game theory is used to analyze Toft’s 
“strategic action theory” in order to determine an optimal strategy for asymmetric 
warfare.  Chapter II defines the strategy related legal responsibilities of the 
uniformed leaders of the U.S. military and analyzes the history of the strategies 
of the adversaries to Department of Defense operations, prior to 9/11.  Chapter 
III explores the strategy focus of the professional military education of the 
uniformed leaders responsible for the strategy presented at the 9/15 meeting.  
Chapter IV presents recommendations for future U.S. military preparations that 
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I. AN OPTIMAL APPROACH TO ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT  
A. THE NCS MEETING ON 9/15 
On 15 September 2001, President Bush assembled his National Security 
Council at Camp David to develop a strategy for retaliating against the 
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks.  The then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Hugh Shelton, presented the National Security Council with three 
Department of Defense developed Courses of Action for a retaliatory strategy 
against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.  A Washington Post article 
reported the following on the three courses of action: 
 
The first called for a strike with cruise missiles, a plan the military 
could execute quickly if speed was the President's overriding 
priority. The missiles could be launched by Navy ships or Air Force 
planes from hundreds of miles away. The targets included al 
Qaeda's training camps.  
The problem, Shelton said, was that the camps were virtually empty 
and therefore the missile attacks would not be that effective. 
Clearly, Shelton was not enamored of this idea, nor were the 
others. Bush had brushed off the possibility from Day One that his 
response would be an antiseptic "pinprick" attack.  
Option Two combined cruise missiles with manned bomber attacks. 
Shelton said  Bush could initially choose a strike lasting three or 
four days or something longer, maybe up to 10 days. The targets 
included Al Qaeda training camps and some Taliban targets, 
depending on whether the president wanted to go after the Taliban 
militarily at the start. But this too had limits. As Cheney had said the 
first night of the crisis, there were few high-value targets in 
Afghanistan, a country devastated by two decades of war. Another 
disadvantage was that it could reinforce perceptions that the United 
States wanted a largely risk-free war on terrorism.  
Shelton described the third and most robust option as cruise 
missiles, bombers and what the planners like to call "boots on the 
ground." This option included all  the elements of the second 
  2
option along with U.S. Special Forces, the elite  commandos, and 
possibly the Army and Marines being deployed inside  Afghanistan. 
But he said it would take a minimum of 10 to 12 days just to get 
initial forces on the ground-in reality it took far longer-because 
bases and overflight rights would be needed for search-and-rescue 
teams to bring out any downed pilots.2  
These courses of action (COAs) could be very crudely summarized as: 
COA 1 (Bomb them with smart munitions); COA 2 (Bomb them with smart 
munitions and manned bombers… for up to 10 days); COA 3 (Get “boots on the 
ground” to direct bombing them with smart munitions and manned bombers).  
The irony of these strategies was that as he presented the options, General 
Shelton continued to reinforce the accepted fact that there was little in 
Afghanistan worth bombing in the first place.  President Bush reportedly 
remarked to members of his staff that the Shelton presentation was 
“unimaginative”.  The Washington Post reports that CIA Director, George Tenet, 
and his Counterterrorism Center Director, Kofer Black, designed the actual 
strategy that became the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, which 
led to the overthrow of the Taliban regime and the dispersion of Al Qaeda 
elements, including Usama bin Laden, from Afghanistan.3   
B. THE U.S. MILITARY AND DIRECT CONVENTIONAL MANEUVER 
WARFARE 
The ability of the U.S. military to defeat an adversary in a direct 
conventional maneuver battle is unparalleled, as witnessed in Operation Desert 
Storm and the initial seizure of Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In addition 
to the conventional ground maneuver preeminence of U.S. forces, the U.S. 
military has displayed the capability to establish near absolute, if not truly 
                                            
2 Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Washington Post, Thursday, January 31, 2002; “10 DAYS IN 
SEPTEMBER: Inside the War Cabinet: At Camp David, Advise and Dissent: Bush, Aides Grapple 
with War Plan, p A01. 
3 Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Washington Post, Thursday, January 31, 2002; “10 DAYS IN 
SEPTEMBER: Inside the War Cabinet: At Camp David, Advise and Dissent: Bush, Aides Grapple 
with War Plan. 
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absolute, control of desired air and sea space to support these conventional 
campaigns.  The conventional combined arms campaign is the forte of the U.S. 
military.  However, preeminence in this manner of warfare does not directly 
translate to preeminence in all manners of warfare.   
The U.S. military has not always succeeded in warfare where the 
adversary chooses not to engage in conventional warfare, as witnessed in 
Vietnam and currently in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  These campaigns have 
been categorized under a number of rubrics, over the years.  Whether they are 
called, Unconventional Warfare (UW), Irregular Warfare (IW), Counterinsurgency 
operations (COIN), Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), or Military Operations Other than 
War (MOOTW); all have the common theme of not being direct campaigns of 
conventional maneuver battle but, being indirect.  In these indirect warfare 
campaigns, the adversary has attempted, and in some cases succeeded, to 
erode the power, influence, and will of the U.S. military rather than seeking to 
destroy it on the field of battle. 
A number of authors have stated that the reason the U.S. military has 
been and is unsuccessful in these indirect warfare campaigns is because of the 
overwhelming emphasis placed on becoming and maintaining its preeminence in 
the direct warfare campaign.  Further, two scholars have inferred direct 
attribution for this phenomenon of focusing on conventional warfare back to the 
earliest days of the U.S. military.  Rothstein and Beckett each present the 
Commander of the Continental Army, General George Washington, as the 
genesis for the concept of developing and maintaining a conventional warfare 
focused U.S. military, to the detriment of an unconventional or indirect warfare 
focus.   
Rothstein writes: 
The U.S. Army’s history of unconventional warfare began with 
continental militia in the American Revolution, which first fought its 
better-armed and better-trained opponents with a combination of 
political organization and guerrilla tactics.  But when George 
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Washington took command of the immature Continental Army, his 
first order of business was to create an army that could fight in the 
properly accepted European manner.  Washington wanted a proper 
army; he wanted a conventional army.4 
           
In explaining the response to an alternative guerrilla campaign strategy 
forwarded by the Continental Army’s third ranking general, Charles Lee, Beckett 
writes: 
Washington, however, recoiled from encouraging an internal 
conflict damaging to the social fabric and, in any case, believed that 
only winning a conventional war would demonstrate the legitimacy 
of the new nation.5 
 
These descriptions of General Washington’s strategy have potentially 
inspired the creation of the world’s preeminent conventional military force.  
However, both the inferences by the authors and whatever inspiration the 
concept, in these two quotes, provided to the later establishment of a U.S. 
military near totally focused on conventional warfare fail to recognize the reality 
of either General Washington’s military background or how he actually executed 
his campaigns. 
On May 28, 1754, Washington, with only a year of military experience, 
ordered the first shots of the French and Indian War while leading forty men and 
a dozen Iroquois Indians while successfully defeating a French element using 
unconventional tactics.  In Washington’s second engagement, he was defeated 
and forced to surrender when employing conventional tactics against the 
unconventional tactics of the French and Indians.  In the third and final 
                                            
4 Hy Rothstein. Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare.  Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 2006, p. 27. 
5 Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their 
Opponents since 1750. New York: Routledge. 2001, pp 3-4. 
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engagement in which Washington participated, in May 1755, while serving under 
the command of British Major General Braddock, the French and Indians, 
employing unconventional tactics, again defeated Washington’s side, who 
employed conventional tactics. 6  Even with these tactical victories by the 
element in each that employed indirect warfare, the war itself was largely decided 
by the conventional strategy of the British.  Nonetheless, Washington’s initial 
military experience surely impressed upon him the power of indirect warfare, 
especially when the opponent chooses conventional warfare. 
After taking a fifteen-year break in military service and upon taking 
command of the Continental Army, Washington proceeded to implement a 
strategy that relied on a combination of conventional warfare and indirect 
warfare, having personally witnessed the value of the latter in the French and 
Indian War.  These included indirect warfare campaigns such as, naval privateer 
operations to secure supplies and guerrilla element activities.  The latter led to 
the evacuation of the Carolinas by the British, among other successes.  
Eventually, these all contributed to the Continental Army victory.  Seemingly, 
Washington must have known in certain situations conventional warfare was 
required and in other situations, indirect warfare was the most applicable method 
of war. 
Beckett concedes, “In many respects, the outcome of the war in the 
South, to which the British switched their main effort in 1779-80, actually 
depended more on the irregular conflict at the local level than on conventional 
battles between the British and Continental armies.”7  The Second Continental 
Congress chose Washington, in 1775, as their commander-in-chief of the 
Continental Army.8  No one can then assume that Washington did not personally 
 
                                            
6 Langguth, A.J. Patriots: The men who started the American Revolution. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1988. pp 289-313. 
7 Beckett, p 3. 
8 McCullough, David. 1776. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005. pp 20-35. 
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understand this situation and therefore appreciate the value of applying indirect 
warfare against a conventionally operating foe, four years into his command of 
the Continental Army. 
If Rothstein and Beckett are correct in interpreting George Washington’s 
leadership as the genesis of a conventional warfare focus in the U.S. military, the 
explanation then is that the U.S. military learned the wrong lesson from 
Washington’s leadership.  Washington’s balance of conventional and indirect 
warfare ultimately led to victory.  His success was not simply the result of a sole 
focus on conventional warfare. 
C.  APPROPRIATE STRATEGIES: DIRECT VS INDIRECT 
The lesson of balancing conventional, or direct, and indirect warfare, 
witnessed and applied by General Washington, is the subject of a recent study 
by Ivan Arreguín-Toft.  Although Toft examines historical data on conflicts other 
than the French and Indian War and the American Revolution, his conclusion 
mirrors that which one can assume General Washington learned and applied.  
Toft presents a “strategic interaction theory” in his recently published How the 
Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.9  Toft’s theory is essentially a 
contest or two-player game between a Strong Actor and a Weak Actor.   
A Strong Actor can be defined as a state entity possessing Diplomatic, 
Informational, Military, and Economic (D-I-M-E) resources greatly outweighing 
those of their opponent, specifically Military.  A Weak Actor can be defined as a 
state or non-state entity possessing limited, or no, D-I-M-E resources, specifically 
                                            
9 Ivan Arreguín-Toft. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.  New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp 38-43. 
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Military.10  Each actor has two strategies to employ in any conflict with the other, 
a Direct Approach or an Indirect Approach.  A Direct Approach can be defined as 
a strategy synonymous with conventional military operations at the maneuver 
warfare end of the conflict spectrum.  Toft defines Direct Approach as, 
“target[ing] an adversary’s armed forces with the aim of destroying or capturing 
that adversary’s physical capacity to fight, thus making will irrelevant.”11  An 
Indirect Approach can be defined as a strategy synonymous with irregular 
warfare or similar forms of operations at the low-intensity conflict end of the 
conflict spectrum.  Toft defines Indirect Approach as, “most often aim[ing] to 
destroy an adversary’s will to resist, thus making physical capacity irrelevant.”12  
A model of Toft’s “Strategic Interaction Theory” is depicted in Figure 1. 
Weak Actor Strategic Approach 
Direct                        Indirect 
  Direct   
Strong Actor  
Strategic Approach    
Indirect 
  
Figure 1.   Toft’s “Strategic Interaction Theory”13  
Toft’s model depicts the asymmetry of conflict between a Strong Actor and 
a Weak Actor.  The asymmetry of the starting position of a Strong or Weak Actor 
                                            
10 Toft, p 2; NOTE: Toft defines his utilization of the terms “Strong Actor” and “Weak Actor” 
by comparison of each actor’s ‘relative material power’.  He then defines ‘relative material power’ 
as, “the product of a given state’s population and armed forces.”  He acknowledges that other 
‘quantifiable proxies’ are used elsewhere to determine state power and concedes, “no single 
measure appears to be sufficient on its own.”  Later, when defining ‘strategy’, Toft refers to, “the 
totality of an actor’s resources directed toward military, political, economic, or other objectives.” (p 
29) For the purposes of this study, the author will utilize the Joint Publication 1-02, "DOD 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms D-I-M-E construct of defining state power, which 
closely represents Toft’s state power definition. (JP 1-02, as amended through 14 September 
2007 and retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict /data/i/02716.html). 
11 Toft, p 34. 
12 Toft, p 34. 
13 Toft, p 39 
     Strong Win       Weak Win 
    Weak Win       Strong Win 
  8
attributes to his conclusion that if the conflict is conducted with similar strategies, 
the Strong Actor will win.  This is logical, since the employment of similar 
strategies would mean the Weak Actor would be attempting to go “toe-to-toe” 
with a Strong Actor, who by definition possesses the greater resources.  
However, he concludes that if the conflict is conducted with dissimilar strategies, 
the Weak Actor will win.  This is also a logical conclusion if one considers that it 
means the Strong Actor will be employing his wealth of resources in a manner 
that is not addressing the manner the Weak Actor is seeking to determine the 
outcome.  This negates the power of the Strong Actor’s starting position and his 
associated wealth of resources.   
Toft validates his theory by analyzing 202 historical cases of asymmetric 
conflicts from 1816 to 2003.  He uses the histories of these conflicts in the 
Correlates of War Project data set which list over 4,000 conflicts, during this 
period.  He considered conflicts asymmetric if the halved product of one actor’s 
armed forces and population exceeded the simple product of its adversary’s 
armed forces and population by 5:1 or more.14  The available data enabled Toft 
to consider only 173 of the 202 asymmetric conflicts.  Toft’s research and 
analysis of this data, given the parameters of his coding, shows that when actors 
employ similar strategies (e.g. Direct-Direct and Indirect-Indirect) the Strong 
Actor won 76.8% of the 151 historical cases.  When actors employ dissimilar 
strategies (e.g. Direct-Indirect and Indirect-Direct) the Weak Actor won 63.6 of 
the 22 historical cases. 15   
One manner of analyzing Toft’s “strategic interaction theory” is by applying 
mathematical game theory.  John Nash was one of the first to develop both 
noncooperative game theory and cooperative game theory in the 1950s.  His 
work remains some of the bedrock principles of economic theory and Nash was 
                                            
14 Toft, p 43. 
15 Toft, pp 43-45. NOTE: Data on 29 of the original 202 cases did facilitate coding. 
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awarded the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics. 16  Nash’s work readily applies to 
economic situations where tangible outcomes are easily derived from a variety of 
standard business metrics, like a cost benefit analysis.  Nash’s work is thought 
less applicable in political science because of the requirement to assign values, 
which are exceedingly difficult to determine when factors like opponent’s 
psychological value of an action becomes a variable but is less than tangible.  
Ironically, game theory was not only developed by the U.S. military, but it was 
specifically developed to solve the largest political-military problem in the history 
of the world, the U.S./Soviet Nuclear Arms Race in the Cold War.17  The 
implications drawn from an application of Nash’s Game Theories to a political–
military situation not only can provide a potential solution for political–military 
situations, but the whole concept Nash built his work on was originally intended 
for such use. 
As previously noted, Toft’s research and analysis provides historically 
based statistical results in Strong and Weak Actor asymmetric conflicts.  
Unfortunately, Toft does not show the statistical results of each type of conflict 
(e.g. Direct vs. Direct, Indirect vs. Direct, Direct vs. Indirect, Indirect vs. Indirect).  
Instead, he only published the statistical results of the analysis of similar strategy 
and dissimilar strategy conflicts.  These statistics are insufficient to employ game 
theory to analyze Toft’s “strategic interaction theory”.   
Although not the most optimal, it is possible to employ game theory 
without exact statistical results; understanding that the result of this manner of 
analysis is just as subjective as the inputs used in place of scientifically gathered 
data.  When scientifically gathered data is unavailable, Nash’s theories require 
the use of cardinal values for the variables in a given situation in order to attain 
the most accurate outcomes.  Cardinal values are derived from applying an 
                                            
16 For all Practical Purposes: Introduction to Contemporary Mathematics, 4th edition, 
Gordonsville, VA: W H Freeman & Co., 1996, p 586; NOTE: If not otherwise cited, the 
applications of Game Theory employed are drawn from this source. 
17 Philip D. Straffin. Game Theory and Strategy, Washington: Mathematical Association of 
America, 1993. p 73.   
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interval scaling to a previously rank ordered group of options.  Rank ordering a 
group of options provides the ordinal scale of those options, so that only the 
order of the numbers matters, not their absolute or relative magnitude.18   
For example, if you were seeking the greatest return from three options 
(A, B, C) where Option A returns $20, Option B returns $50, and Option C returns 
$15.  An ordinal ranking of these options, where higher is better, would then be: 
Option B returning $50 (ordinal value of 3), Option A returning $20 (ordinal value 
of 2), Option C returning $15 (ordinal value of 1).  When looking at the ordinal 
ranking of 3, 2, 1, the degree to which 3 is better than 2 or 1 is not a factor. 
If the degree to which 3 is better than 2 or 1 is a factor, an interval scale is 
required to reflect the ratios of differences between the numbers.  The value of 
each option on that scale is the option’s cardinal value.19  In the previous 
example, it may be sufficient just to employ the return values of each option as 
the individual option’s cardinal value.  In some case it may be more beneficial to 
apply the ordinal values of the outcomes to a 0-100 cardinal scale.   Whatever 
the logic behind the interval scaling, the cardinal value of an option enables an 
observer to see the significance of the difference between that option and other 
available options.  Lastly, if the degree to which 3 is better than 2 or 1 is a factor 
but absolute or relative magnitude is not required, it is possible to employ the 
ordinal value of an option as that option’s cardinal value.  If this method was 
employed in the previous example, it would then be understood that Option B, 
with an ordinal value of 3, is three times preferable to Option C, with an ordinal 
value of 1, and is one and a half times preferable to Option A, with an ordinal 
value of 2.  This method, of using ordinal values as cardinal values, does not 
provide the most accurate outcomes but does provide a general indication of the 
returns from a game.  As previously mentioned, it is difficult to establish an  
interval scaling in a political-military situation when trying to evaluate with game 
theory because a wide variety of variables contribute to assigning any given 
                                            
18 Straffin, p 50. 
19 Straffin, p 50. 
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cardinal value.  The model of Toft’s “strategic interaction theory” represents a 2x2 
game matrix, which can be analyzed with an application of Nash’s theories if 
ordinal values are used as cardinal values.     
It is necessary to assign ordinal values to the outcomes, which would 
generally be true of any Strong Actor or Weak Actor.  These ordinal values may 
not match a specific actor’s assessed cardinal value.  Due to variance, not only 
among actors but down to the commanders of the executing forces, therefore 
varying situation to situation, it must be assumed that ordinal values can be used 
as cardinal values.  This means that for this analysis a 4 is twice as good as a 2, 
a 3 is three times as good as a 1, et cetera. 
With this assumption, it is then possible to assign ordinal values to the 
outcomes depicted in Toft’s model.  Beginning with the Strong Actor, who by 
definition possesses greater D-I-M-E resources, specifically Military, than an 
opposing Weak Actor, it is logical that a Strong Actor would favor a Direct vs. 
Direct conflict over any other manner of conflict with a Weak Actor.  In Toft’s 
model, this manner of conflict both results in a win for the Strong Actor and 
logically would result in greater returns for the Strong Actor’s economy, by way of 
producing greater requirements for the Strong Actor’s military industrial complex.  
In this situation, the Strong Actor also has the potential to gain greater diplomatic 
status in relations with other state entities by displaying the preeminence of its 
armed forces.  Even if the result of this conflict is only an informational gain that 
serves as a deterrent for potential opponents in future situations, the Strong 
Actor favors this return.  When using an ordinal scale of 1 to 4, with 4 being best, 
a Strong Actor would assign a Direct vs. Direct conflict an ordinal value of 4. 
 Any actor would favor a win to a loss, therefore a Strong Actor would 
favor a win in an Indirect vs. Indirect conflict over either of the other two 
remaining types of conflict that result in Weak Actor wins.  This assessment is 
made regardless if the Strong Actor possesses a sufficient Indirect Approach 
capability when the conflict develops or whether the conflict results in 
tremendous economic gain for the Strong Actor.  The potential loss of diplomatic 
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status and associated informational damage inherent to losing a conflict would 
outweigh the Strong Actor’s preference or armed forces orientation prior to 
entering the conflict.  The Strong Actor would then assign an Indirect vs. Indirect 
conflict an ordinal value of 3. 
Of the two remaining manners of conflict with a Weak Actor, both resulting 
in Weak Actor wins, a Strong Actor would favor entering a conflict with an Indirect 
Approach while the Weak Actor employs a Direct Approach over a Direct vs. 
Indirect conflict.  In an Indirect vs. Direct conflict, because the Strong Actor 
possesses the greater D-I-M-E resources, the Strong Actor might potentially be 
able to convert the conflict by applying its wealth of greater resources and make 
it a Direct vs. Direct conflict.  Even though the conflict results in a loss, the Weak 
Actor is meeting the Strong Actor in the Strong Actor’s traditionally most favored 
manner.  In a Direct vs. Indirect conflict, the opposite is the case where the 
Strong Actor is meeting the Weak Actor in the Weak Actor’s traditionally most 
favored manner.  The Strong Actor would then assign an Indirect vs. Direct 
conflict an ordinal value of 2 and a Direct vs. Indirect conflict an ordinal value of 
1.  
Upon entering the game, the Weak Actor’s situation is the exact opposite 
of the Strong Actor.  By definition, the Weal Actor possesses substantially less D-
I-M-E resources.  When assigning Weak Actor ordinal values logically one can 
then assume a Weak Actor would favor employing an Indirect Approach because 
this approach requires less material resources.  In Toft’s model, the Direct vs. 
Indirect conflict results in a Weak Actor win and the Indirect vs. Indirect does not.  
The Weak Actor would assign a Direct vs. Indirect conflict an ordinal value of 4. 
With the same logic applied to the Strong Actor, a Weak Actor would favor 
a win to a loss.  Of the three remaining manners of conflict in this game, an 
Indirect vs. Direct conflict results in a win, the other two do not.  Again, just as 
with the Strong Actor, this assessment is made regardless if the Weak Actor 
possesses a sufficient Direct Approach capability when the conflict develops. 
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Additionally, in this circumstance the Weak Actor is meeting the Strong Actor at 
“his own game”.  Nonetheless, a Weak Actor would assign an Indirect vs. Direct 
conflict an ordinal value of 3.   
In the two remaining manners of conflict with a Strong Actor, both resulting 
in Strong Actor wins, a Weak Actor would favor entering a conflict with an Indirect 
Approach while the Strong Actor employs an Indirect Approach over a Direct vs. 
Direct conflict.  In a Direct vs. Direct conflict, because the Strong Actor 
possesses the greater D-I-M-E resources, the Weak Actor simply cannot 
compete.  Whereas, in an Indirect vs. Indirect conflict, the Weak Actor is 
employing his favorable manner and making the Strong Actor employ a strategy 
that is his less than favorite means.  The Weak Actor would assign an Indirect vs. 
Indirect conflict an ordinal value of 2 and a Direct vs. Direct conflict an ordinal 
value of 1. 
By assigning Strong and Weak Actor ordinal values to the outcomes of 
Toft’s “strategic interaction theory”, the result is, for military implications, the total 
conflict zero-sum game depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Weak Actor 
Direct                        Indirect 
  Direct         
Strong Actor     
Indirect   
 
 
Figure 2.   Toft’s “Strategic Interaction Theory” with assigned Strong Actor, 
Weak Actor Ordinal Values.  
Again, using the previous assumption, these ordinal values can be used 
as cardinal values for each actor and this enables an analysis with Nash’s 
Theories.  The initial analysis of this game shows that there is no pure strategy 
for either actor to employ that can ensure in that actor winning the game.  The 
             4,1                      1,4 
            2,3             3,2 
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next step in analyzing a total conflict is to determine the Expected Value of the 
game for each actor.  The Expected Value for both actors in a game is known as 
the Nash Equilibrium.  Interestingly, in this game the Nash Equilibrium value is 
(2.5, 2.5).   The lowest ordinal value assigned to a win by either actor was a 3 
and the highest ordinal value assigned to a loss by either actor was a 2.  The 
Nash Equilibrium in this game is then just above a loss and just below a win for 
either the Strong or Weak, a stalemate.  
In order to achieve this outcome the Weak Actor must utilize an optimal 
mixed strategy of employing a Direct Approach 50% of the time and employing 
an Indirect Approach 50% of the time.  In order for the Strong Actor to achieve 
this outcome, the Strong Actor’s optimal mixed strategy is to employ a Direct 
Approach only 25% of the time and employ an Indirect Approach 75% of the 
time. (See Appendix A “Game Theory Calculations”)  These optimal mixed 
strategies are somewhat inconclusive because even if they are employed, 
neither the Strong Actor nor the Weak Actor, over the long run, is assured of 
averaging a win, just averaging essentially strategic stalemates.   
Up to this point, this game between the Strong and Weak Actor has been 
considered as a game being played simultaneously without communication 
between the two players.  If the same game is analyzed as a non-simultaneous 
game with some manner of communication between the two players, even if not 
in direct communications, the analysis could consider strategic moves each 
player could make to possibly enhance their Expected Value of the game.  An 
analysis of strategic moves is not typically conducted when analyzing zero-sum 
games because all possible outcomes are already pareto optimal, that is if there 
is a change to the outcome it will only benefit one of the two players.  However,  
in this case, an analysis of strategic moves does provide a Course of Action for 
an actor to employ to exceed the Nash Equilibrium or averaging a strategic 
stalemate. 
There are three possible strategic moves any player in a game can make 
or a player can use any combination of the three strategic moves.  The strategic 
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moves are a first move, a threat, and/or a promise.  In analyzing the strategic 
moves available to the Strong and Weak Actor: the initial analysis is of an actor’s 
first moves; then if the actor has a threat available and if so whether that threat 
will work independently; then if the actor has a promise available and if so 
whether that promise will work independently; and finally if there is a combination 
of any of these. 
Considering the Strong and Weak Actors’ situation in this game, there is 
no first move they can make that will exceed the Nash Equilibrium (2.5, 2.5).  For 
example, if the Strong Actor moves first and employs a Direct Approach, the 
Weak Actor will counter by employing an Indirect Approach resulting in a Weak 
Actor win (1, 4).  Similarly, neither the Strong Actor nor the Weak Actor has a 
threat to make or a promise to the other, which will result in an outcome that 
exceeds the Nash Equilibrium.  Thus, the reason strategic moves are not 
typically employed when analyzing zero-sum games.   
However, the evaluation of strategic moves does provide an answer if the 
analysis of each actor is compared side-by-side, specifically the strategic first 
moves of each actor.   If an actor (Actor A) allows/forces the opposing actor 
(Actor B) to commit the first move and Actor A possesses the capacity to execute 
the opposing strategy, Actor A increases its probability of securing a victory.  
When viewed through Toft’s research of historical asymmetric conflict cases, this 
strategy would mean that a Strong Actor could increase its probability of victory 
from 36.4% to a theoretically ‘guaranteed’ 76.8%.  This strategy would mean that 
a Weak Actor could increase its probability of victory from 23.2% to a 
theoretically ‘guaranteed’ 63.6%.20  What does this mean to the manner in which 
a Strong or Weak Actor should optimally prepare for future conflicts?  
                                            
20 Toft, p 43-45. 
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D. THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN OPTIMAL MIX OF STRATEGIES: DIRECT 
AND INDIRECT 
Additional assumptions are required in order to apply the analytical 
outcome back to the political-military situation.  The first is to assume that there is 
a direct correlation between the strategy derived from an application of game 
theory to Toft’s “strategic interaction theory” and the manner in which an actor 
should be prepared for future conflicts.  This assumption understands the 
resulting probabilities of an application of game theory are taken over the long 
run, meaning the immediate relevancy in any specific conflict may be limited.  
Additionally, although he has only published five of his studies in the book, Toft’s 
“strategic interaction theory” is based on his examination of the combined 
statistical and comparative case study analysis of 173 separate historical case 
studies of asymmetric conflict.  The results of this game theory analysis would 
then be an extrapolation of Toft’s theory but, as every stock investment program 
warns, “past performance is no guarantee of future returns.” 
When this assumption is applied to the previous analysis, actors are able 
to determine the implications of this analysis.  The results of a Game Theory 
analysis shows that the only way any actor, Strong or Weak, can maximize their 
probability of a victory is to be equally capable of executing a Direct or Indirect 
strategy in response to the opposing element’s strategic first move.  This implies 
both actors possess the capability to execute a 50-50 ratio (Direct-Indirect) of 
approaches.  Yet by definition, the Weak Actor possesses less Direct Approach 
military capabilities.  The Weak Actor is not then able to actually possess the 
ability to match a Strong Actor in the Direct Approach.  This fact essentially 
factors out the ability of the Weak Actor to determine the outcome of a conflict, 
meaning any conflict between a Strong and Weak Actor is the Strong Actor’s to 
win or lose.   
If a Strong Actor forces or allows the opposing Weak Actor to commit the 
first move and if that Strong Actor possesses the capability to execute either a 
Direct or Indirect strategy, the Strong Actor maximizes its probability of winning.  
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To visualize this concept the bar graph in Figure 3 depicts the optimal mix of 
Direct and Indirect capability of a Strong Actor’s military prepared to theoretically 












Figure 3.   Theoretical Optimal Mix of Strong Actor Direct and Indirect 
Approach Capabilities.  
 
A final assumption may clarify these implications.  Conflict campaigns can 
be composed of a combination of Direct and Indirect strategies.  Toft employed 
broad generalizations to define the strategy employed by an actor in one 
category or the other by the preponderance of the actor’s effort.  Similarly, there 
are less than optimal applications for forces optimized to conduct operations in 
one strategy, Direct or Indirect, in the opposing strategy (i.e. Infantry units 
optimized for maneuver warfare used in an Indirect strategy, Civil Affairs units 
optimized for low-intensity conflict used in a Direct strategy, etc.).  It is then 
necessary to assume that there is not a correlation between the outcomes of this 
analysis and the requisite force structures for the actors to execute the 
strategies. 
This assumption means the Strong Actor 50-50 ratio (Direct-Indirect) does 
not infer a requirement for a force structure that is 50% optimized for the Direct 
Approach and a bifurcated 50% optimized for the Indirect Approach.  There is an 
acknowledged historical precedence for the application of forces optimized for 
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the Direct Approach in an Indirect Approach and vice versa.  The result of this 
analysis corresponds only with the application of those forces as it pertains to the 
correct strategy, dictated for the Strong Actor by the strategic first move of the 
Weak Actor.  Once the Weak Actor makes the strategic first move by employing 
either a Direct or Indirect Approach, the Strong Actor must employ a similar 
strategy.  The Strong Actor then would inherently have a requirement for leaders 
skilled at planning and leading Direct and Indirect Campaigns, which are capable 
of directing the actions of subordinate elements in those campaigns.  It is 
arguably logical that an Indirect strategy would require more forces optimized for 
that manner of operations, but the matter actually depends more on the 
commanders of the strategy being employed against the Weak Actor.   
If the leaders of a strategy understand the requirements of that strategy, it 
is already assumed that given their rank and position as leaders, they can 
develop and issue orders directing an element that is not optimally organized to 
accomplish a task that will result in that element’s successful attainment of the 
desired endstate.  Additionally, if leaders understood the requirements of an 
Indirect strategy, it may be assumed they would direct the tailoring of the force 
structure to meet the requirements of forces optimized in that approach, if the 
current force structure did not. 
E. THE LIMITS OF THIS ANALYSIS 
As previously mentioned, the game theory analysis of Toft’s “strategic 
interaction theory” could not be optimally completed with his published material.  
The manner utilized, employing logically deduced ordinal values as cardinal 
values, is illustrative but, lacks empirical support.  However, it is questionable 
whether a large enough data set is available to conduct a more scientific analysis 
of each type of strategy conflict.   
Toft utilized the Correlates of War data set and found 202 asymmetric 
conflicts between 1816 and 2003.  He could only use 173 cases in his analysis.  
Toft only coded 22 of these conflicts as having adversaries employ dissimilar 
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strategies; either Indirect/Direct or Direct/Indirect (Strong Actor/Weak Actor).  It 
would be hard to believe that there are 11 cases where a Strong Actor has gone 
Indirect while a Weak Actor goes Direct but, even if these cases are equally 
distributed between these two types of conflicts, the outcomes could not easily or 
equally be compared against the outcomes of the 151 cases where the 
adversaries employed similar strategies.  
Nonetheless, Toft’s work is a significant study of the history of asymmetric 
conflict.  As the sole remaining super-power, the U.S. military will remain involved 
in asymmetric conflict for the foreseeable future and as David C. Mccullough, the 
author of 1776, observed, “History is a guide to navigation in perilous times.”21  
F. SUMMARY 
Toft’s “strategic interaction theory” provides an interesting and historically 
based model.  When analyzed through Nash’s game theories, the model 
becomes illustrative of the preparations a Strong Actor should make prior to 
future conflicts with Weak Actors.  In the end, a Strong Actor is found capable of 
significantly influencing their destiny in future conflicts with Weak Actors, winning 
76.8% of these conflicts.  A Strong Actor that fails to prepare equally as well with 
a Direct or Indirect Approach to meet a Weak Actor, does so at their own peril 
and at the risk of only winning 36.4% of these conflicts.  This is a similar 
conclusion and principle one could logically assume General Washington knew 
and applied, if one looked beyond the anecdotal evidence of Washington’s 
predisposition toward a conventionally focused U.S. military.   
A Weak Actor, Al Qaeda, employing and Indirect Approach, commercial 
aircraft as weapons of mass effect, against a Strong Actor, the United States, is 
exactly the situation that occurred on 9/11.  The Weak Actor committed the first 
strategic move.  However, the U.S. military did not present a strategy for 
defeating the Weak Actor that was similar to the Weak Actor’s Indirect Approach, 
                                            
21 “history” Internet; retrieved from http://www.wisdomquotes.com/002391.html accessed on 
13 October 2007 
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at the National Security Council meeting on 9/15, and therefore did not 
recommend applying the theoretically correct solution.  Instead, the U.S. military, 
represented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then General Hugh 
Shelton, presented a Direct Approach strategy, which in theory is not optimal in 
such situations.  Why? 
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II. THE  INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY 
In his study of organizational behavior in the decision process, Graham 
Allison states, “The behavior of [existing] organizations-and consequently of the 
government-relevant to an issue in any particular instance is, therefore, 
determined primarily by routines established prior to that instance.”22  An 
examination of the history of the existing organization, being the Department of 
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should explain who was 
responsible for the presentation on 9/15.  This responsibility was the result of 
‘routines established prior to that instance.’  Allison also observes, “Operational 
experiences in the field reinforce certain capacities and routines, even endow the 
capacities and routines with a ceremonial power that provides legitimation 
internally or in dealings with the outside world.”23  A larger examination of the 
operational experiences of the Department of Defense may identify which 
capacities and routines the organization reinforced.  This examination will be of 
operations directed or authorized by the President and will be conducted through 
the lens of the strategy employed by the element opposing U.S. military action.  
The earlier analysis of Toft’s work indicates U.S. military strategy, whether Direct 
or Indirect, should be similar to that employed by its opponents. 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR MILITARY ADVICE TO 
THE PRESIDENT 
In 1947, the 80th Congress, under the National Security Act, created the 
Department of Defense from the War Department and the Department of the 
Navy.24  The legislation also directed the establishment of the National Security 
                                            
22 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, 2nd edition, New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc., 1999, p 144. 
23 Allison and Zelikow, p 155. 
24 Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, “Public Law 253, The National 
Security Act of 1947” published in The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and 
Organization 1944-1978, edited by Alice C. Cole, Alfred Goldberg, Samuel A. Tucker, Rudolph A. 
Winnacker, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print Office, 1978. pp 35-50. 
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Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Resources Board.25  
In addition to creating the Department of Defense, this legislation specifically 
directed the establishment of the office and responsibilities of the Secretary of 
Defense and the Department of the Air Force.26  As a result, the uniformed 
services were each represented to the Secretary of Defense or President by a 
Chief of Staff equivalent.  The Army Chief of Staff, Navy Chief of Naval 
Operations, and Air Force Chief of Staff combined to form the initial Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS).27  The primary JCS strategy responsibilities were, “to prepare 
strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces” and 
“act as principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of 
Defense.”28  A committee voting system crafted strategic plans and military 
advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense. Each Chief of Staff and the 
Chief of Naval Operations had one vote.  All plans or advice to the President and 
the Secretary of Defense required unanimous approval, which often limited such 
advice to ‘lowest common denominators’.  This sometimes led to inadequate 
recommendations.   
 Minor amendments were passed, over the next 40 years, but the structure 
of the Department of Defense, created by the National Security Act of 1947, 
remained essentially unchanged until 1986.  In 1986, the 99th U.S. Congress 
passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which 
significantly altered the Department of Defense.  The stated purpose, in part, of 
the bill was: 
To reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian 
authority in the Department of Defense, to improve the military 
advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and 
the Secretary of Defense, to place clear responsibility on the 
                                            
25 “National Security Act of 1947”, Section 101, 102, 103. pp 36-40.  
26 “National Security Act of 1947”, Section 202, 207. pp 40-43. 
27 “National Security Act of 1947”, Section 211.a. p 45. NOTE: A non-voting Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff position was created in Public Law 216, 10 August 1949, and the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps was authorized coequal status with other Chiefs in Public Law 
416, 28 June 1952. pp 94 & 114. 
28 “National Security Act of 1947”, Section 211.b.1. and c. p 45. 
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commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for 
the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and 
ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully 
commensurate with that responsibility, to increase attention to the 
formulation of strategy and to contingency planning…29 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act empowered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff as the principal uniformed military adviser to the President, National 
Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.30  Specifically, with respect to advice 
on strategic direction and planning, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is 
responsible for, “Assisting the President and Secretary of Defense in providing 
for the strategic direction of the armed forces” and “Preparing strategic plans.”31  
Additionally, the bill created a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
empowered the Geographic Combatant Commanders with a direct chain of 
command to the President and Secretary of Defense, via only the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.32  The Vice Chairman is a non-voting member of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff but is prepared to function as the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in his absence.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff further, 
“serves as the spokesman for the commanders of the [geographic] combatant 
commands, especially on the operational requirements of their commands.”33 
Four days after the 9/11 attacks, the National Security Council assembled 
at Camp David.  At the time, President Bush was attempting to develop a 
strategy for how the United States would respond to the 9/11 attacks.  The 
military advice the President received was inadequate because it was wholly 
focused on a Direct Approach when admittedly there were limited targets 
                                            
29 Public Law 99-433, 99th Congress, “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986” Internet; retrieved from 
http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/99433pt1.pdf; accessed on 5 August 2007. 
30 “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986”, Section 151.b. 
31 “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986”, Section 153.a.1 
and 2. 
32 “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986”, Section 154 and 
211. 
33 “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986”, Section 163 
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available, making a Direct Approach infeasible.34  Although the recommendation 
was inadequate, this was an example of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, then General Hugh Shelton, fulfilling the responsibilities prescribed in 
Goldwater-Nichols.  Shelton presented a strategy for military operations in a 
specific Geographic Combatant Command Area of Responsibility, U.S. Central 
Command.  From the responsibilities prescribed in Goldwater-Nichols, it can then 
be assumed that the Commander of U.S. Central Command, then General 
Tommy Franks, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then General 
Richard Myers, endorsed the strategy General Shelton presented to the National 
Security Council. General Shelton served as the spokesman for General Franks.  
General Myers would have been responsible for presenting the same 
information, if General Shelton could not.  Additionally, General Shelton’s term of 
office was due to expire 1 October 2001 and President Bush nominated General 
Meyers as the successor to General Shelton on 24 August 2001. 35  General 
Myers’ assumption of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff occurred two weeks 
after the meeting on 9/15.  Certainly, General Shelton would have reviewed the 
presentation with General Myers, since Myers would be the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff during execution of the recommendation.  Although General 
Shelton is the only individual associated with the strategy presented at the 
National Security Council meeting on 9/15 in the Washington Post article, it is 
logical to assume that Shelton was speaking for himself, General Franks, and for 
General Myers.  Responsibility for the inadequacy of the recommendation to the 
President from his principal military advisor, is shared then by Generals Shelton, 
Myers, and Franks. 
                                            
34 Woodward, Bob and Dan Balz.  Washington Post, Thursday, January 31, 2002; “10 DAYS 
IN SEPTEMBER: Inside the War Cabinet: At Camp David, Advise and Dissent: Bush, Aides 
Grapple with War Plan 
35 Gerry J. Gilmore, “Bush Nominates Myers as JCS Chief, Pace as Vice”, American Forces 
Press Service, Aug. 24, 2001, Internet; retrieved from http://www.defenselink.mil/news 
/newsarticle.aspx?id=44758 accessed on 5 August 2007. 
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B. THE OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE 
A potential answer to the question of why Generals Shelton, Myers, and 
Franks presented only a Direct Approach strategy might be that the Department 
of Defense had no prior or very limited experience in dealing with opponents that 
employed Indirect Approach campaign strategies.  However, a look back at the 
Department of Defense’s 54 year history of military operations prior to the attacks 
on 9/11, reflects near constant operations in activities where the opponent did not 
employ a Direct Approach strategy against U.S. military forces.  Arguably, in all 
of the operations the U.S. military conducted between the creation of the 
Department of Defense and 9/11, the opponents only employed a Direct 
Approach strategy twice, the Korean War and Operation Desert Storm.36  
Unquestionably, there are a number of incidents when opponents employed 
Direct Approach tactics.  For example, both Operation Just Cause (Panama) and 
Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada) would not be considered as Direct because in 
neither case did the opponent choose to employ a Direct Approach campaign 
strategy to defeat U.S. military forces.  Each government was executing some 
manner of Indirect Approach against the U.S. government, until the U.S. military 
invaded these countries, at which point tactical elements employed Direct 
Approach tactics, but there is no literature to suggest the defense was part of a 
directed Direct Approach strategy.37  Desert Storm and Korea are the only U.S. 
military operations, in the time period examined, where the opponents’ campaign 
strategies to attain their desired outcome were to directly engage with and 
                                            
36 T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study In Unpreparedness.  New York: Bantam, 
1991; Michael R Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the 
Conflict in the Gulf. New York: Little Brown and Company, 1995 
37 Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: the planning and execution of joint operations in 
Grenada, 12 October-2 November 1983, Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997; Operation Just Cause: the incursion into Panama, 
Washington, D.C.: The Center of Military History, 2004. NOTE: In How the Weak Win Wars: A 
Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Toft considers the North Vietnamese response to U.S. Operation 
Rolling Thunder (FEB 65 – OCT 68) to be a Direct Approach.(pp 144-168)  Unlike Toft, this 
author considers only the tactical and operational-level response as Direct.  This author considers 
the North Vietnamese strategic-level strategy as an Indirect Approach throughout U.S. active 
participation in the conflict.   
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destroy U.S. military forces on the battlefield.  In all of the other U.S. military 
deployments or operations during this time period there was either an opponent 
employing an Indirect Approach strategy or, in some cases, no armed opponent 
at all.  For example, in Vietnam, the opponent employed an Indirect Approach 
strategy; in Humanitarian Assistance operations, such as Operation Silent 
Promise in Mozambique, or events like the U.S. military deployment of forces at 
the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli “Six Day War”; there was no opponent to U.S. 
military operations.38 
The game theory analysis of Toft’s “strategic interaction theory”, presented 
in Chapter I, showed that in order for the U.S. military to theoretically maximize 
its probability of winning, it must be equally capable of conducting a Direct or 
Indirect Approach to strategy.  Additionally, the U.S. military’s approach should 
be identical to whichever strategy the opponent employs.  To be equally capable 
essentially means the U.S. military should possess a 50% Direct Approach 
strategy capability and a 50% Indirect Approach strategy capability. 
It could be argued that that the U.S. military’s capacity for or the threat of 
the Direct Approach served as a deterrent, specifically on the German front 
against the Soviets and the DMZ in Korea.  Although there is undoubtedly some 
validity to this argument, the argument is counterfactual.  Writing on strategy in 
the early 1960s, Beaufre observed of the Cold War, “Its tactics are industrial, 
technical, and financial.  It is a form of indirect attrition; instead of destroying 
enemy resources, its object is to make them obsolete, thereby forcing upon him 
enormous expenditure.”39  History shows that Beaufre had it right nearly 30 years 
prior to the conclusion of the Cold War. 
Several sources illustrate the preponderance of Indirect Approach 
operations that the United States conducted between 1947 and 2001.  For 
                                            
38 “Six Day War” Internet; retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/6-day.htm 
and “Operation Silent Promise” Internet; retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops 
/silent_promise.htm accessed on 5 August 2007. 
39 Andre’ Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, London: Faber and Faber, 1965, p 77. 
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example, the Congressional Research Service report RL30172 entitled 
“Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2004” offers a 
detailed synopsis of U.S. military international operations.40  In this report, the 
Congressional Research Service lists 127 instances of the U.S. military 
conducting operations abroad, between 1947 and September 2001, the 
timeframe under investigation in this thesis. 
GlobalSecurity.org, a U.S. based non-partisan research center, also 
maintains a database of publicly documented domestic and international U.S. 
military operations. 41  This database lists over 200 instances of Presidential 
directed or authorized domestic and international U.S. military operations, 
between 1947 and September 2001.  Some of the operations listed in this 
database are not considered significant for the analysis in this thesis.  For 
example, Operation Steel Box was a transfer of chemical munitions and is listed 
in the GlobalSecurity.org database.42  Although the operation was conducted 
under the auspices of a Presidential authorization, it is not considered 
strategically significant in this analysis. 
There are a number of databases available with a listing of U.S. military 
operations.43  However, the Congressional Research Service report RL30172 
and the GlobalSecurity.org database are both comprehensive and detailed.  The 
Congressional Research Service report RL30172 and the GlobalSecurity.org 
database have been combined in Appendix B (U.S. Military Deployments and 
                                            
40 “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2004”, CRS Report 
RL30172, Internet; retrieved from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30172.htm accessed 
on 5 August 2007. 
41 “U.S. Military Operations”, Internet; retrieved from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops /index.html accessed on 5 August 2007. 
42 “Operation Steel Box”, Internet; retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military 
/ops/steel_box.htm accessed on 5 August 2007. 
43 See: “U.S. Military Deployments/Engagements 1975-2001” prepared by the Department of 
Defense and Military Department Public Affairs Offices, Center for Defense Information, Internet; 
retrieved from http://www.cdi.org/issues/USForces/deployments.html accessed on 5 August 
2007; “From Wounded Knee to Iraq: A Century Of U.S. Military Interventions” by Dr. Zoltan 
Grossman, Internet; retrieved from http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/interventions.html 
accessed on 5 August 2007. 
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Operations, 1947 – 2001).  Operations are listed in reverse chronological order 
by the start date of U.S. military operations in each specified locale.  If 
subsequent authorizations provided for continuous operations in that same 
locale, these are listed under the start date of the initial authorization.  Operations 
listed in Appendix B are shown as separate instances if there was specific 
Presidential authorization issued for a different operation.  For example, the 
Vietnam War is annotated as a single Presidential authorized event.   All of the 
various U.S. military operations conducted under specific authorizations from 
Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, or Nixon in Southeast Asia in support of the 
Republic of South Vietnam are also each considered single Presidential directed 
events.  Conversely, the Korean War is annotated as a single Presidential 
authorized event, but there were no other specific Presidential authorizations for 
other military operations in support of the Republic of Korea. 
Appendix B is most likely not all inclusive in its listings of U.S. military 
operations.  Both referenced sources, the CRS report and GlobalSecurity.org, 
note the absence of covert or other classified U.S. military operations from their 
listings.  However, it is safe to assume that U.S. military operations not listed 
would have been against opponents that did not employ a Direct Approach 
strategy.  Additionally, this manner of analysis gives equal weighting to each 
operation.  The Korean War or Operation Desert Storm, both operations 
consisting of the deployment of hundreds of thousands of U.S. military forces, 
are viewed equally with Operation Greensweep, where a much smaller number 
of U.S. military forces reportedly assisted Drug Enforcement Agency elements in 
conducting counter-narcotics operations in California.44  However, this analysis is 
not intended to decipher quantitative levels of effort on the part of U.S. military 
forces.  It is only intended to facilitate a trend analysis of the requirement for the 
deployment of U.S. military forces, between 1947 and 2001.   
                                            
44 “Operation Greensweep”  Internet; retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military 
/ops/greensweep.htm accessed on 5 August 2007. 
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The list of operations in Appendix B is further classified by whether the 
opposing element employed a Direct Approach campaign strategy toward U.S. 
forces.  If this is the case, the event is classified as Direct because this is the 
approach strategy the analysis of Toft indicates the U.S. military should have 
employed against the opponent in that event.  If the opposing element did not 
employ a Direct Approach campaign strategy, the operation is considered 
Indirect because this is the approach strategy the Toft analysis indicates the U.S. 
military should have employed against the opponent in these events.  If there 
was no opposing element, the operation is also considered Indirect because in 
order for the U.S. military to employ a Direct Approach strategy, it must have an 
opponent to destroy. 
There are a total of 210 separate Presidential directed or authorized U.S. 
military operations listed in Appendix B.  When these separate events are 
classified as either Direct or Indirect, in 208 of the 210 operations the opponent 
did not employ a Direct Approach campaign strategy in attempting to defeat the 
U.S. military forces.  This means 99.1% of the time U.S. forces should not have 
employed a Direct Approach.  A Direct Approach was required to meet an 
opponent employing their own Direct Approach strategy in only 2 incidents, or 
.9%of the operations in this database.  In other words, the Department of 
Defense should have employed an indirect action approach to counter the 
opponents’ strategy in nearly every case.  The result of this analysis compared to 
the conclusions drawn from the game theory analysis of Toft’s “strategic 






















Figure 4.   Theoretical Optimal Mix of Strong Actor Direct and Indirect 
Approach Capabilities vs. History of the requirement for U.S. military 
forces to conduct operations, 1947-2001.  
 
The graph in Figure 4 shows that the theoretically optimal strategy of 50% 
Direct Approach and a 50% Indirect Approach would have been insufficient to 
address the actual requirements for the deployment or operations by U.S. military 
forces between 1947 and 2001.  To meet the actual requirements that led to U.S. 
military forces being deployed during this period, the U.S. military should have 
been much more Indirect Approach strategy capable than the theoretically 
optimal status of being equally capable with a Direct Approach strategy.   
Interestingly, the analysis of the post-Cold War era – 26 December 1991 
to 11 September 2001 – shows that in 100% of the operations by U.S. military 
forces, the opponents did not employ Direct Approach campaign strategies to 
defeat U.S. forces.   Moreover, 108 operations, or slightly more than 51% of all 
the operations of U.S. military forces between 1947 and 2001, are listed with 
start dates after the identified conclusion of the Cold War.  In other words, more 
than half of the U.S. military operations conducted between 1947 and 2001  
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occurred in the decade preceding the 9/11 attacks.  Following the game theory 
analysis of Toft, not once should U.S. forces have executed a Direct Approach 
strategy in these operations.   
C. THE LIMITS OF THIS ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the history of the operations conducted by the Department 
of Defense was drawn only from open sources.  It is most likely not an all-
inclusive listings of U.S. military operations.  Also, applying equal weight, 
regardless of the size and scope of the operation, does not acknowledge many 
factors.  However, it is only intended to facilitate a trend analysis of the 
requirement for the deployment of U.S. military forces, between 1947 and 2001, 
and does reflect a significant trend in the history of these operations.  
Additionally, the coding employed of the adversaries’ strategy in each event 
listed may be arguable, on specific cases.  For example, Toft considers the North 
Vietnamese response to U.S. Operation Rolling Thunder (February 1965 – 
October 1968) to be a Direct Approach.45  Unlike Toft, this author considers only 
the tactical and operational-level response as Direct.  This author considers the 
North Vietnamese strategic-level strategy as an Indirect Approach throughout 
U.S. active participation in the conflict.  Regardless, even if the very few arguable 
cases were recoded, the fact remains that in the history of the Department of 
Defense the U.S. military conducted overwhelmingly more operations where an 
Indirect Approach would have been the optimal strategy. 
D. SUMMARY 
General Curtis LeMay served as Chief of Staff of the Air Force from 1961 
to 1965.  At that time, he held one-quarter of the committee decision on the 
recommendation from the uniformed leaders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the 
President and National Security Council.  On the issue of how to proceed in 
Vietnam, General LeMay writes, "My solution to the problem would be to tell [the 
                                            
45 Toft, pp 144-168. 
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North Vietnamese Communists] frankly that they've got to draw in their horns and 
stop their aggression or we're going to bomb them into the Stone Age."46  
Although a wholly inappropriate solution and exclusively a Direct Approach 
strategy, General LeMay was largely a prodigy of the strategic bombing 
campaigns of World War II, leading bomber elements in both Europe and the 
Pacific. 47 
Appendix B demonstrates that the U.S. military has a preponderance of 
prior experience in dealing with opponents that have employed an Indirect 
Approach campaign strategy.  In the 54 years preceding the attacks on 9/11, the 
U.S. military was over 110 times more likely to engage an opponent employing 
an Indirect Approach.  Therefore, the U.S. military should have been 110 times 
more prepared to employ its own Indirect Approach to defeat that opponent.     
Although none of the other requirements for operations by U.S. military 
forces between 1947 and 2001 were in response to attacks that caused nearly 
3,000 fatalities, the U.S. military leadership at the time of 9/11 attacks was 
familiar with opponents who employed Indirect Approach campaign strategies.  
However, the uniformed leaders of the U.S. military--specifically Generals 
Shelton, Franks, and Myers – presented strategy advice that was more 
reminiscent of General LeMay, than it was of the history of the Department of 
Defense.  Contrary to Allison’s observation, “Operational experiences in the field 
reinforce certain capacities and routines,” the strategy advice presented reflected 





                                            
46 Curtis E. LeMay with MacKinlay Kantor, Mission with LeMay, New York: Doubleday & Co., 
Inc., 1965, p 565. 
47 LeMay, pp 220-390. 
48 Allison and Zelikow, p 144. 
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III. TEACHING STRATEGY 
The 18th century French General and strategist, Marshal de Saxe, once 
observed: 
Few men occupy themselves in the higher problems of war.  They 
pass their lives drilling troops and believe that this is the only 
branch of the military art.  When they arrive at the command of 
armies, they are totally ignorant, and in default of knowing what 
should be done.  They do what they know.49  
  
The conduct of military operations was, in Marshal de Saxe time, and 
remains considered a profession of arms.  The professionalization of militaries 
and the conduct of military operations has evolved significantly since the 18th 
century.   In the U.S. military, the professionalization now includes formalized 
instruction of officers, throughout their careers.  The instruction of U.S. military 
officers was codified under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act of 1986 
and later amendments to Title 10 of the U.S. Code.  Although Generals Shelton, 
Franks, and Myers completed the strategy-focused component of professional 
military education prior to the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, an examination of 
their instruction may provide insights about the strategy advice they collectively 
gave President Bush on 9/15. 
A. U.S. MILITARY PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OF OFFICERS 
Edward N. Luttwak, a current Senior Fellow with the Washington-based 
strategic think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies and 
consultant to various U.S. government agencies including the Department of 
Defense, once wrote:  
All armed forces combine elements of attrition [Direct Approach] on 
the one hand and relational maneuver [Indirect Approach] on the 
other in their overall approach to war; their position in the 
                                            
49 Marshal de Saxe (1696-1750), cited in “Military Air Power: The Cadre Digest of Air Power 
Opinions and Thoughts”, Compiled by Lt Col Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF, Internet; retrieved 
from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milquote.doc accessed on 26 September 2007. 
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attrition/maneuver spectrum is manifest in their operational 
methods, tactics, and organizational arrangements, but especially 
in their methods of officer education.50 
 
The professional education of officers within the U.S. military is governed 
by Congressionally mandated law and consists of entry-level indoctrination and 
training, junior officer training, mid-career officer training, and senior officer 
training.  Although each military service has a specific program of military officer 
education that follows this general characterization, Goldwater-Nichols codified 
military officer professional education requirements under the rubric of “Joint 
Professional Military Education.”51   
Title 10 of the U.S. Code currently states: 
Joint professional military education consists of the rigorous and 
thorough instruction and examination of officers of the armed forces 
in an environment designed to promote a theoretical and practical 
in-depth understanding of joint matters and, specifically, of the 
subject matter covered. The subject matter to be covered by joint 
professional military education shall include at least the following:  
(1) National Military Strategy.  
(2) Joint planning at all levels of war.  
(3) Joint doctrine.  
(4) Joint command and control.  
(5) Joint force and joint requirements development.52 
The Army’s formulation of professional education to meet these 
requirements is depicted in Figure 5.  The operational continuum: strategic, 
                                            
50 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare”, Parameters, Vol. XIII, Issue 4, 
December 1983, pp 11-18. NOTE: emphasis added in italics 
51 “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986”, Section 663.b. 
52 “Title 10, Subtitle A, PART III, CHAPTER 107, Section 2151 (Definitions)” Internet; 
retrieved from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00002151----000-
.html; accessed on 2 September 2007. NOTE: All Title 10 references are drawn from this Cornell 
Law School website.   
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operational, and tactical is depicted in the left column.  The area of instruction 
required to prepare Army leaders to operate at each level of the operational 
continuum is listed in the middle column.  The component of the Army’s 
professional military education system designed to provide the instruction to 
prepare Army leaders is listed in the right column. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Army Leader Development53 
 
Although each service has designed its own specific program of military 
officer education, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for 
ensuring each service’s program meets the requirements of the law.  The 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for “Formulating policies for 
coordinating the military education and training of members of the armed 
                                            
53 Jeffrey D. Mccausland and Gregg F. Martin, “Transforming Strategic Leader Education for 
the 21st-Century Army”, Parameters, Vol. XXXI, Issue 3, Autumn 2001, p 22. NOTE: “USAWC” 
means U.S. Army War College 
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forces.”54  Additionally, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff “Advises and 
assists the Secretary of Defense by periodically reviewing and revising the  
curriculum of each school of the National Defense University and of any other 
joint professional military education school to enhance the education and training 
of officers in joint matters.”55  
Senior officer training is conducted at one of the Department of Defense 
“Senior Level Service Schools” or War Colleges for rising Air Force, Army, and 
Marine Colonels or Navy Captains.56  These include the U.S. Army War College, 
U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Air War College, U.S. Marine Corps War College, 
and the National War College.  Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is 
divided into two parts, JPME I and JPME II.  JPME I instruction is typically 
included in all of the services’ mid-career officer training programs.  A specific 
JPME II course is conducted at the Joint Forces Staff College and/or JPME II 
instruction is provided at each of the War Colleges. Completion of a JPME II 
curriculum was mandated in Goldwater-Nichols as a requirement before a senior 
officer can be considered for selection as a General or Flag Officer.57  Title 10 of 
the U.S. Code states: 
 
… the curriculum for Phase II joint professional military education 
shall include the following:  
(1) National security strategy.  
(2) Theater strategy and campaigning.  
(3) Joint planning processes and systems.  
                                            
54 Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Section 153(a)(5)(c)  
55 Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Section 2152(b) 
56 Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Section 2151(b) 
57 “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986”, Section 404; 
now reflected in “Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Section 619 (a) and 661(c)(1)(a). NOTE: “Senior 
officer” refers to Army, Air Force and Marine Colonels or Navy Captains; “General or Flag Officer” 
refers to Army, Air Force and Marine Brigadier General or Navy Rear Admiral 
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(4) Joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities and the 
integration of those capabilities. 58  
 
In 1986, Goldwater-Nichols also directed attendance of a Capstone 
Course for all newly selected General and Flag Officers.59  Currently, the 
National Defense University’s Capstone Course is a six-week seminar program 
whereas War College programs typically run ten or twenty-four months in a 
traditional academic or online academic setting.  Therefore, War Colleges are 
typically the last formal military education program, focused on indoctrinating 
strategy, future General or Flag Officers receive, for the remainder of their 
careers.   
Generals Shelton, Franks and Myers were responsible for the strategy 
advice presented to the President on 9/15.  Although, many of the laws 
governing military education cited earlier were not created yet when these men 
attended their War College programs, the purpose for each program fulfilled the 
requirements codified in later laws.  The following sections analyze the course 
descriptions in the curricula of these Generals, and code them as either Direct or 
Indirect. This analysis shows the orientation of the last formal strategy-focused 
military education these men received in their careers was overwhelmingly Direct 
Approach focused.  Therefore, specifically examining the curricula of the War 
College programs attended by Generals Shelton, Franks, and Myers might 
indicate why Direct Approach strategy options were the only ones presented to 
the President on 9/15. 
B. GENERAL SHELTON, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE (CLASS OF 1983) 
After completing a successful junior officer career in command of tactical 
Special Forces and conventional U.S. Army Infantry elements, then Lieutenant 
                                            
58 Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Section 2155(c) 
59 “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986”, Section 663 
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Colonel Shelton entered the National War College in the fall of 1982.60  The 
National War College is located at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, and is a 
component of the National Defense University.  The fall 1982 National Defense 
University Catalogue stated: 
The mission of the National War College is to conduct a senior-
level course of study promoting excellence in the development of 
national security policy and strategy, and the application of military 
power in support thereof, including doctrine for joint and combined 
operations and consideration of warfighting capabilities. 
Through study and research, enhance the preparation of selected 
personnel of the Armed Forces, the Department of State, and other 
U.S. Government departments and agencies to perform high level 
command and staff policy functions associated with national 
security strategy formulation and implementation.61 
 
The program of instruction for GEN Shelton’s National War College Class 
consisted of a Core Curriculum of eleven seminar-type courses, which were 
supplemented by three strategic exercises.62  Additionally, General Shelton took 
 
 
                                            
60 “General Henry Hugh Shelton Biography” Internet; retrieved from 
http://www.ncsu.edu/extension/sheltonleadership/general_bio.htm accessed on 2 September 
2007. 
61 National Defense University 1982-1983 Catalogue, Washington, DC: Fort Lesley J. 
McNair, pp 9-11 
62 The 1983 Curriculum Guide of the National War College (for academic year 82-83) 
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five seminar-type electives.63  The courses General Shelton completed with 
course descriptions from The 1983 Curriculum Guide of the National War College 
are presented in Table 1.    
                                            
63 NOTE: GEN Shelton's elective listing was provided by the National War College Records 
Office and the information was drawn from the "End of Year [1983] Report".  This information was 
provided to the author in an e-mail entitled “FW: Shelton Effective” on 14 August 2007 and 
released with the permission of Ms Mollie Murphy, National Defense University General Counsel. 
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Course name 
Course Description published in The 1983 Curriculum Guide of the National War 
College (for academic year 82-83) 
Art of War An examination of periods in military history which signaled changes in the nature of 
war and its conduct; the American approach to war; and the ideas of classical and 
modern strategic thinkers to assess their influence and contemporary relevance. (Text 
include Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Weigley) 
Human Dimensions in National 
Security Affairs 
An introduction to the role individual behavior factors (e.g. values, perceptions, 
motivations, lifestyles, etc.) play in ethics, interpersonal relations, group dynamics and 
decision making.  A particular emphasis will be placed on the importance of behavioral 
factors to creativity and how to think innovatively. 
Approaches to Policy Analysis 
and Decision-making 
An introduction to qualitative and quantitative approaches to policy analysis and 
decision-making with emphasis on developing an understanding of what the various 
approaches can provide a decision maker and how he can use them to make decisions
International Security 
Environment 
An appraisal of issues and trends in the international political and economic 
system.  A consideration of the institutions and instruments available to achieve 
national objectives, alleviate tensions, reduce to eliminate sources of conflict, 
prevent war, and refine judgments about uses of military power. 
Politics, Policy and Resource 
Allocation in the American 
Political System 
An analysis of the roles, relationships and influences of the Legislative Branch, other 
public and private institutions and groups, and Executive Branch legislative liaison and 
public affairs activities on security policy development and the allocation of resources. 
This course will also cover guidelines for appearing before congressional committees 
and relations with the media. 
Policy, Planning and National 
Security Decision-making 
An analysis of the national security policy planning and decision-making process within 
the Executive Branch and the National Security Council system with particular 
emphasis on the Department of Defense and its major components. 
Terrorism and Counterterrorism This simulation focuses on the decisions involved in developing a strategy and for using 
the instruments of statecraft in countering and resolving a terrorist incident with 
international implications. 
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International Security Studies: 
U.S. Interests and the Major 
Powers and Regions 
A systematic analysis of security conditions, policies and programs and their impacts on 
the defense and foreign policies of selected countries.  A review of the security factors 
which influence and shape national policies.  An appraisal of security commitments and 
agreements and their implications for U.S. interests and programs.  Practical exercises 
in security requirement identification will conclude each regional study. 
National Security and Policy 
Decisions 
A policy formulation and decision exercise.  This exercise focuses on policy options for 
presidential decisions and builds on the regional security issues exercise in the 
International Security Studies course. 
Strategic Planning for Joint and 
Combined Operations 
An examination of military strategy and strategic planning requirements for the conduct 
of theater-level joint and combined operations.  The course focus is on strategic, tactical 
and doctrinal concepts and their use in developing force application strategies, 
contingency and operations plans and in conduct of joint operations. 
U.S. Defense Policy, Military 
Strategy and Force Planning 
An analysis of current U.S. defense policies and the translation of those policies into 
military strategy and force requirements.  The course assesses the rationale, logic and 
implications of defense policies, identifying strategic issues and defense trends, then 
focuses on the translation of that policy into military strategy and force requirements. 
The course builds on the issues and trends identified in the International Security 
Studies course and the principles identified in the Art or War course.   
Within the core program various opportunities for active involvement are offered by the following exercises and 
simulations 
Strategic Nuclear Conflict 
Management 
A conflict management political-military simulation designed to explore the implications 
of escalation in conflict; the problems and uncertainties escalation poses for decision 
makers; and the difficulties inherent in de-escalation and war termination. 
Strategy and Force Development The exercise builds on the policy decisions reached in the National Security Policy 
Decisions exercise.  Phase I focuses on the translation of national security policy 
decisions into military objectives, strategic requirements and the development of a 
preferred national military strategy, desired force capabilities and characteristics, and 
required force levels.  Phase II focuses on the force levels that can be achieved under 
constrained fiscal guidance, the changes required in strategy and/or force mix, and a 
risk assessment in terms of what can and cannot be accomplished. 
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Contingency Planning and Force 
Employment 
A crisis management political-military simulation and current forces capability exercise 
in contingency planning and force application to provide the opportunity to apply 
knowledge developed through the year.  Phase I focuses on the diplomacy of crisis 
management and development of contingency plans to meet regional crisis with 
worldwide implications.  Phase II focuses on contingency plan execution with forces 
being deployed and employed. 
Electives (National War College 
Course # and Name) 
Course Description published in The 1983 Curriculum Guide of the National War 
College (for academic year 82-83) 
NOTE: GEN Shelton's elective listing was provided by the National War College Records Office and the information was 
drawn from the "End of Year [1983] Report". 
346: Contemporary Middle East 
and North Africa: Conflict and 
Competition 
An examination of patterns of conflict and competition in the Middle East and North 
Africa.  The focus of the course will be on intra-state and intra-regional conflict and 
competition, their extra-regional implications, and the influence of extra-regional conflict 
and competition in the region.  
337: Why Human Warfare - the 
Causes of War 
The objective of this course is to develop an understanding of the various approaches 
to the problem of human conflict, to become familiar with the latest research into the 
causes of war, and to develop an understanding of how the causes of war might affect 
crisis management in international affairs and strategic thinking. (The syllabus for the 
course lists the texts for the course as Waltz's Man, the State and War; and Wright's A 
Study of War) 
325: Ethics, the Public Servant 
and War 
An examination of public service and war from the moral and ethical perspective.  The 
focus of the course will be on the application of principles and lessons learned to 
current public service moral challenges and ethical issues.  The course will also focus 
on the use of force, its control and expansion from a moral and ethical perspective. 
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125: Introduction to Computers This course focuses on computer fundamentals and major computer/user related 
management problems.  It begins with a description of hardware (mainframe and 
peripherals equipment) and machine architecture (computer arithematic, memory, 
central processors, input/output, internal operations and basic design features) and 
progresses to software (operating systems, utility progress, database management 
systems and applications programming). The software portion of the course culminates 
with each student writing a basic language program, the purpose of which is to insure 
that students feel comfortable using computer terminals and programs to solve 
management problems.  The remainder of the course will be directed to computer 
management concerns such as ADP procurement and economic analysis procedures, 
data processing installation performance indicators, centralization vs. decentralization 
of computer power, privacy legislation, and computer security.  Finally the course will 
examine the future of computer hardware and software technology. 
155: Executive Health and 
Fitness 
This course examines the role of health and fitness in a typical executive lifestyle.  The 
primary objective of the course is to provide sufficient information to enable each 
student to develop a personalized exercise and dietary fitness program under 
professional supervision.  In addition, attention is given to developing sound exercise 
programs for one's subordinates and peers in the military services and civilian 
agencies. 
 
Table 1.   General Hugh Shelton’s National War College Course Listing 
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Only one of Shelton’s fourteen courses is coded as focusing on an Indirect 
Approach, given the descriptions provided in the National War College records.  
The “International Security Environment” titled course focused on methods of 
employing elements of national power, other than solely military, to address 
national security.  Although the “Terrorism and Counterterrorism” titled simulation 
might suggest an Indirect Approach orientation, examination of the records for 
this simulation showed the orientation was specifically toward applying Direct 
Approach strategies to these situations (i.e. deployment and use of counter-
terrorism forces, deployment of fighter escort aircraft to force high jacked airliners 
to land, etc.).  Although, some Indirect Approach oriented courses were offered in 
the Curriculum Guide during the 1982-1983 Academic Year, General Shelton 
selected none of them as electives.  Instead, of the five electives he chose, two 
would not be considered to have a strategic orientation, “Introduction to 
Computers” and “Executive Health and Fitness”, while the other three were all 
focused toward a Direct Approach.  This means that only one of the seventeen 
courses or 5% of all the strategic instruction General Shelton received in his last 
formal military education program prior to becoming the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff focused on the Indirect Approach.  The result of this analysis 
compared to the conclusions drawn from the game theory analysis of Toft’s 
“strategic interaction theory” and the actual requirements for the deployment or 




















































































Figure 6.   Theoretical Optimal Mix of Strong Actor Direct and Indirect 
Approach Capabilities vs. History of the requirement for U.S. military 
forces to conduct operations, 1947-2001 vs. General Shelton’s War 
College Course Strategy Orientation.  
 
The graphs in Figure 6 shows that General Shelton’s War College Course 
Strategy Orientation did not meet the theoretically optimal strategy focus of 50% 
Direct Approach and a 50% Indirect Approach.   More importantly, General 
Shelton’s War College Course Strategy Orientation is nearly a polar opposite of 
the actual requirements for the deployment or operations by U.S. military forces 
between 1947 and 2001.  Lastly, General Shelton became Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1997.64  This graph shows that only 5% of the 
strategy oriented focus of General Shelton’s War College instruction prepared 
him to deal with the eighteen U.S. military operations, listed in Appendix B, 
                                            
64 “General Henry Hugh Shelton Biography” Internet; retrieved from http://www.ncsu.edu 
/extension/sheltonleadership/general_bio.htm accessed on 2 September 2007. 
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initiated after his assumption of Chairmanship.  The Direct Approach strategy 
focus of the remaining 95% of his instruction was not specifically applicable to 
any of the ongoing operations or those initiated while fulfilling his Goldwater-
Nichols prescribed role as the principal military adviser to the President. 
C. GENERAL MYERS, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE (CLASS OF 1981) 
After completing a successful junior officer career as an Air Force fighter 
pilot, then Lieutenant Colonel Myers entered the U.S. Army War College in the 
fall of 1980, located at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.  The U.S. Army War 
College Curriculum Pamphlet, Academic Year 1981, stated its mission as: 
To provide a course of study which will prepare graduates for 
senior leadership positions in the Army, Defense and related 
department and agencies by professional military education in 
national security affairs with emphasis on the development and 
employment of military forces in land warfare. 
Conduct strategic studies on the nature and use of the U.S. Army 
during peace and war; address issues with respect to Army 
participation in joint arenas; address major concerns for which an 
independent, internal study capability is needed; and contribute 
independent studies and analyses on issues of current and future 
import to the Army. 
In accomplishing this mission the U.S. Army War College conducts 
resident and corresponding study courses for selected officers of 
the Active and Reserve components and federal civilian 
employees.65 
 
The program of instruction for Myers’ U.S. Army War College Class 
consisted of a Common Overview or Core Requirements which contained four 
general segments of strategy study; The National Environment and the Evolution 
of Military Strategy, The International Environment, U.S. Strategy and Supporting 
Programs, Command and Management, Military Plans, Operations and 
Wargames.66  Additionally, General Myers took four seminar-type electives.67  
                                            
65 “U.S. Army War College, The Curriculum Pamphlet, Academic Year 1981” Carlisle 
Barracks, 1980. p 1. 
66 “U.S. Army War College, The Curriculum Pamphlet, Academic Year 1981” Carlisle 
Barracks, 1980. 
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The courses General Myers completed, including course descriptions from The 
U.S. Army War College Curriculum Pamphlet, Academic Year 1981, are 
presented in Table 2. 
                                            
67 NOTE: General Myers' elective listing was provided the Army War College Registrar's 
Office and the information was drawn from General Myers' official transcripts.  This information 
was provided to the author in an e-mail entitled “RE: Automated Ask Form (UNCLASSIFIED)” on 
18 July 2007. 
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The National Environment: 1) Examine America's heritage of values and principles
which determine her national purpose and influence the conduct of her affairs. 2) Study
the concept of "National Power" as applied to the United States. 3) Identify U.S.
domestic issues, trends and forces which influence the formulation of national priorities,
national strategy and the application of national power. 
Part I: The National Environment 
and the Evolution of Military 
Strategy 
The Evolution of Military Strategy studies:1) The evolution of strategic thought. 2) The
principles of war. 3) The strategic concepts of land, maritime and air power. 4) The
military strategies of World War I and II. 5) The strategies of containment and 
deterrence. 6) The strategies of massive retaliation and flexible response. 7) The
military strategies of the Vietnam War. 8) Current U.S. military strategy. 
The International Environment: Identify the impact of issues, trends and forces, in the
following selected regions of the world, on U.S. national security interests: the Western 
Hemisphere; Western and Eastern Europe; Sub-Saharan Africa; Middle East/North 
Africa; Asia.  Assess political, economic and social issues, trends and forces worldwide.
Part II: The International 
Environment, U.S. Strategy and 
Supporting Programs 
U.S. Strategy and Supporting Programs:1) Review current U.S. national and military 
strategy. 2) Review Soviet policy. 3) Assess the strategic nuclear balance. 4) Assess 
the ability of the U.S. and the USSR to project power. 5) Assess the military force
balance and influence in the selected regions above. 6) Plan an employment of military
forces for contingencies in selected regions. 7) Formulate a U.S. national and military 
strategy for the midrange period. 8) Design minimum risk forces to support global
military strategy. 
Part III: Command and 
Management 
Study the art of command in peace and war.  Study the human dimensions of
leadership, command and management, to include selected aspects of motivation,
interpersonal relationships, communications, and group dynamics-in the context of a full 
range of potential future assignments: high level staff; project management; and
tactical, logistical and administrative command.  Study management principles and their
relationship and application to the management of defense resources, including
identifying those major defense management problems facing government executives
and military commanders and managers in the near-term future.  Examine 
contemporary management tools, techniques and systems, which facilitate 
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decisionmaking.  Study the Department of Defense Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System (PPBS), related issues and the Army application of PPBS.  Study 
current issues relative to the full range of Army subsystems including personnel,
logistics, research, development and acquisition, financial management, training and
readiness. 
Part IV: Military Plans, 
Operations and Wargames 
Study an analysis of defense plans and operations of Allied Command Europe (ACE) to
include northern, central and southern Europe, Central Army Group and Northern Army
Group, and the ability of the United States to reinforce and sustain forces in Europe.
Examine the impact of technology on the modern battlefield.  Applying gaming
procedures to a NATO theater level environment.  Review deployment and contingency
concepts for critical areas of the world.  Apply gaming procedures to a Joint Task Force
environment.  Analyze defense concepts and operations of the United Nations
Command, the Eighth U.S. Army and the Combined Command in South Korea.  Study
crisis management at the JCS level.  Review techniques of politico-military simulation. 
Participate in a politico-military simulation. 
Electives (Army War College Course Name) Course Description published in the U.S. Army War College, The Curriculum 
Pamphlet, Academic Year 1981 NOTE: General Myers' elective listing was provided by the Army War College Registrar's 
Office and the information was drawn from General Myers' official transcripts. 
Strategic Issues of World War II Considers a number of controversial and vital strategic decisions of World War II, both 
by the Allies and Axis powers.  By analyzing and evaluating the decisionmaking 
process, with the benefit of a clear historical perspective, students will gain insights into 
the problems faced by decisionmakers at the highest military and national levels during 
wartime. 
Air Power: The Past, Present and 
Future Contrasts in Command  
This course is primarily designed for Air Force students to better preparing for staff and 
command assignments in the field.  However, it would benefit any student who 
anticipates a joint tour after graduation.  The course includes: A short historical 
development phase featuring lectures given by guest speakers.  Case studies of the 




issues by MAJCOM briefing teams. (Course description drawn from course syllabus. 
This course was not listed in the Curriculum Pamphlet which, was published prior to the 
beginning of the Academic Year.)  
Planning and Operations 
Management of the Intelligence 
Community 
Examines the role and interrelationships of the various agencies of the intelligence 
community. 
Warsaw Pact Strategy, Planning, 
and Operations 
The course will be developed through an examination of: Review of Soviet strategies 
(1917-1967); Objectives and current strategy; Organization and equipment of forces; 
Political and military warning; Mobilization and reinforcement; Logistical support; Tactics 
and Operations; Appraisal of Warsaw Pact capabilities. (Course description drawn from 
course syllabus.  This course was not listed in the Curriculum Pamphlet which, was 
published prior to the beginning of the Academic Year.)  
 




Given the descriptions provided in the U.S. Army War College records, 
none of the Common Overview or Core Requirements can be coded as focusing 
on an Indirect Approach.  Although, some Indirect Approach oriented courses 
were offered in the Curriculum Guide during the 1980-1981 Academic Year, 
General Myers selected none of them as electives.  Instead, of the four electives 
he chose, all focused on a Direct Approach.  This means that none of the 
strategic instruction General Myers received in his last formal military education 
program and prior to becoming the Vice Chairman and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, focused on the Indirect Approach.  The result of this analysis 
compared to the conclusions drawn from the game theory analysis of Toft’s 
“strategic interaction theory” and the actual requirements for the deployment or 

















































































Figure 7.   Theoretical Optimal Mix of Strong Actor Direct and Indirect 
Approach Capabilities vs. History of the requirement for U.S. military 
forces to conduct operations, 1947-2001 vs. General Myers’ War 
College Course Strategy Orientation.  
  52
The graphs in Figure 7 shows that General Myers’ War College Course 
Strategy Orientation did not meet the theoretically optimal strategy focus of 50% 
Direct Approach and a 50% Indirect Approach.   More importantly, General 
Myers’ War College Course Strategy Orientation is the polar opposite of the 
actual requirements for the deployment or operations by U.S. military forces 
between 1947 and 2001.   
Reportedly, in his very first conversation with then Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush stated, “… the ball will be in your 
court and Dick Myers’ court.”68  Certainly unbeknownst to President Bush, who 
was depending on General Myers to fulfill his Goldwater-Nichols dictated role as 
principal military advisor, Myers’ last formal professional military education 
consisted of no focused instruction on the strategy required to optimally meet the 
Indirect Approach employing adversary. 
D. GENERAL FRANKS, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE (CLASS OF 1985) 
After completing a successful junior officer career commanding U.S. Army 
artillery elements and holding various staff billets, then Lieutenant Colonel Franks 
entered the U.S. Army War College in the Fall of 1984. General Franks attended 
the same school as General Meyers; however, it is interesting to note that the 
program of instruction for the U.S. Army War College was modified from that 
used for General Myers’ Class of 1981 for the Class of 1985.  The Class of 1985 
program of instruction consisted of a Common Overview or Core Requirements 
of ten seminar-type courses.69  Additionally, General Franks took three seminar-
type electives.70   The U.S. Army War College Resident Student Manual, 
Academic Year 1985, stated: 
                                            
68 Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002, p 19. 
69 “U.S. Army War College, The Curriculum Pamphlet, Academic Year 1985” Carlisle 
Barracks, 1984. 
70 NOTE: GEN Franks' elective listing was provided by the Army War College Registrar's 
Office and the information was drawn from GEN Franks' official transcripts.  This information was 
provided to the author in an e-mail entitled “RE: Automated Ask Form (UNCLASSIFIED)” on 18 
July 2007. 
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The mission of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) is to: 
 
a. Prepare officers for senior leadership positions in the Army, Defense, and 
related Departments and Agencies by professional military education in 
national security affairs with emphasis on the development and 
employment of military forces in land warfare. 
b. Conduct strategic studies on the nature and use of the U.S. Army during 
peace and war; address issues with respect to Army participation in joint 
arenas; address major concerns for which an independent, internal study 
capability is needed; contribute independent studies and analyses on 
issues of current and future import to the Army; and examine strategic 
concepts, theories, and philosophies. 
c. Operate a Worldwide Military Command and Control System automatic 
data processing facility in support of the academic program, strategic 
studies, and other requests as directed through the Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army (DSCOPS, DA). 
d. Conduct programs which bear directly on the Army in the field to include 
providing assistance in contingency and mobilization planning, in war 
gaming defense plans, in developing concepts and doctrine at corps and 
echelons above corps, and in conducting applied research in physical 
fitness.71 
The courses General Franks completed with course descriptions from The 
U.S. Army War College Curriculum Pamphlet, Academic Year 1985 are 
presented in Table 3. 
                                            
71 “U.S. Army War College Resident Student Manual, Academic Year 1985, Administrative 




Course Description published in the U.S. Army War College, The Curriculum Pamphlet, 
Academic Year 1985 
Course 1: The Requirements of 
the Professional Leader 
This course will examine the requisites of the military professional on an individual, 
interpersonal and organizational level.  It focuses on the following: Self-Assessment; 
Communication and Group Skills; Senior Command Leadership and Management; 
Ethics and Professionalism; Personal and Family Wellness; and the Human 
Dimensions in combat.... Course 1 sets the framework for the remainder of the 
curriculum. 
Course 2: Politics, War and 
Strategy 
Course 2 begins with an introduction to national security policy and an examination of 
the domestic and international factors that shape U.S. policies…. The focus of the 
course then shifts to theoretical and historical analyses of the military strategies that 
evolved to implement policies.  This phase of the course allows an opportunity to 
explore the spectrum of conflict, with special attention being devoted to terrorism and 
the problem of nuclear weapons.  The course also opens the study of Soviet 
perceptions, policies and capabilities that continues throughout the core curriculum, 
providing enough information by the end of Course 2 so that you can examine U.S.
national security priorities for the coming decade and discuss the features of an 
optimum military strategy. 
Course 3: Planning and 
Decisionmaking 
This course addresses the resource allocation (PPBS) and operational planning (JOPS) 
processes that are used at the highest levels of the armed forces of the United States in 
order to insure that these forces can be responsive to threats to worldwide vital 
interests of the United States.... Incidental to this study is the necessity to examine the 
functions and relationships of the highest level organizations within the armed forces of 
the United States. 
Course 4: Military Forces and 
Doctrine 
Course 4 will examine the U.S. Army's land warfare doctrine which distinguishes the 
operational level of war - the conduct of campaigns and large unit action - from the 
tactical level of war.  The course will focus on U.S. Army, joint operations and combined 
operations.  During the course, you will develop operational concepts using current 
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doctrine and capability for employing U.S. and allied forces in a theater of war.  The 
course will also provide you the opportunity to examine the nature of the 
interdependence between strategy, forces and doctrine. 
Course 5: Leadership of the 
Army and Management of Army 
Systems 
This course addresses the subjects of command, leadership and management of the 
U.S. Army.  During the course you will examine the theoretical and practical aspects of 
command, management and organizational leadership; analyze the Army's major 
supporting systems; and discuss the major issues involved in leading the Army and 
managing these systems. 
Course 6:Regional Appraisals This course will examine U.S. interests, policies and strategies in the international 
environment.  It focuses on the five major regions, Europe and North America, Asia and 
the Pacific, the Middle East, including North Africa and South-Southwest Asia, Latin 
America and sub-Saharan Africa.  You will examine the regional factors and trends 
(economic, political, sociological and military) as well as the relationship of the region to 
the larger global arena.  You will identify U.S. interests in the region, how the factors 
and trends impact on those interests - both favorably and unfavorably - and develop 
specific strategies to protect and promote U.S. interests. 
Course 7: Application of Power: 
Strategic Nuclear 
This course addresses general nuclear war.  It emphasizes the evolutionary 
development of U.S. strategic nuclear policy.  A review of U.S. nuclear weapons 
employment policy is conducted along with a look at the intricacies of strategic target 
planning.  A portion of the course is devoted to the ballistic missile threat to our country.
Course 8: Application of Power: 
Contingency Operations 
This course addresses contingency planning for limited war in an immature theater and 
for operations against an insurgency in a revolutionary war environment.  During two 
contingency planning exercises you will develop objectives and formulate strategies 
and operational concepts after analyzing the nature of contingency.  Additionally, you 
also will develop and analyze strategic deployment concepts and gain an in-depth 
understanding of the military dynamics of selected countries. 
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Course 9: Application of Power: 
Theater Operations 
Course 9 provides the military professional an opportunity to study and implement 
political guidance for the conduct of operations within a theater and the transformation 
of that guidance into operational plans.  The emphasis will be on joint and combined 
theater level strategy, planning and operations and the employment of Army forces in a 
ground campaign.... Course 9 is designed to use and build upon all previous courses... 
Course 10: U.S. Global Military 
Strategy 
Course 10 is the capstone of the Common Overview.  It provides a framework in which 
you can bring together many of the incremental elements of instruction you have 
received, and apply the knowledge derived in an exercise designed to surface the most 
critical military strategy issues with which this country may have to deal. 
Electives (Army War College Course Name) Course description drawn from each course's syllabus.  These courses were 
not listed in the Curriculum Pamphlet which, was published prior to the beginning of the Academic Year). 
NOTE: GEN Franks' elective listing was provided by the Army War College Registrar's Office and the information was 
drawn from GEN Franks' official transcripts. 
SOF Planning in support of the 
CINCs 
This course provides a detailed understanding of Special Operating Forces of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force, their organization, missions, capabilities and their ability to support 
the CINCs.  The course includes: Integration of Joint SOF in support of the CINC; a 
detailed look at SOF capabilities; consideration of employment and missions for SOF; 
planning SOF missions and support considerations; commo lash-up of Joint SOF 
operations; PSYOP and Civil Affairs in support of SOF; and a detailed study of OPLAN
4304 (Text included Luttwak, Canby, and Thomas' A Systematic Review of 
"Commando" (Special) Operations, 1939-1980; Geraghty's Who Dares Win: The Story 
of the Special Air Service, 1950-1980; Garrett's The Raiders: The Elite Strike Forces 
that Altered the Course of War and History, as well as a number of then classified 
documents.) "Course Requirement: Each student is expected to: ... Plan and prepare 
short study concerning utilization of SOF in a specific mission (FID, Deep Recce, 
Raid)..." 
Professional Ethics for Senior 
Leaders 
This course will examine ethical reasoning and practice, concentrating on the needs of 
the individuals in positions of senior leadership for: an understanding of the bases for 
moral thought and the ability to lead organizations in moral action. 
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The Challenge of Terrorism This course is designed to provide practical insights into the political, military 
and command relationships involved in an unconventional political-military crisis 
environment--one in which Army field grade officers assigned to field units might 
be forced to communicate directly to the highest levels of government, including 
the President of the United States.  This course will provide participants with an 
appreciation of the leverage on national policy and operations a terrorist 
organization can exert.  It will expose participants to the personal and 
organization dilemmas which will confront policy officials and field officers in 
responding to terrorist acts.  Through participation in a policy and simulation 
game, each participant  will be confronted with the necessity of interpreting the 
security, operational, and doctrinal problems with which the Army could be 
confronted. 




Even though the program of instruction at the U.S. Army War College 
changed between the 1981 and 1985 Academic Years, none of the Common 
Overview or Core Requirements is coded as focusing on an Indirect Approach.  
Some Indirect Approach oriented courses were offered in the Curriculum Guide 
during the 1984-1985 Academic Year and General Franks selected one as an 
elective, “The Challenge of Terrorism.”  Although the “SOF Planning in support of 
the CINCs” titled course might suggest an Indirect Approach orientation, 
examination of the course description and syllabus showed the orientation was 
specifically oriented to the SOF role in Direct Approach strategies.   
This means that only one of the thirteen courses or 7% of all the strategic 
instruction General Franks received in his last formal strategy-focused military 
education program prior to becoming the Commander of U.S. Central Command 
was focused on the Indirect Approach.  The result of this analysis compared to 
the conclusions drawn from the game theory analysis of Toft’s “strategic 
interaction theory” and the actual requirements for the deployment or operations 




















































































Figure 8.   Theoretical Optimal Mix of Strong Actor Direct and Indirect 
Approach Capabilities vs. History of the requirement for U.S. military 
forces to conduct operations, 1947-2001 vs. General Franks’ War 
College Course Strategy Orientation.  
 
The graphs in Figure 8 shows that General Franks’ War College Course 
Strategy Orientation did not meet the theoretically optimal strategy focus of 50% 
Direct Approach and a 50% Indirect Approach.   More importantly, General 
Franks’ War College Course Strategy Orientation is also nearly a polar opposite 
of the actual requirements for the deployment or operations by U.S. military 
forces between 1947 and 2001. 
E. THE LIMITS OF THIS ANALYSIS 
The coding of the strategy-focused instruction for Generals Shelton, 
Myers, and Franks was made through the data available at the respective War 
College institutions attended by each.  Course descriptions listed were copied 
verbatim from available records.  None of the institutions maintained class or 
lecture notes and it is probable some of the content of the actual classroom 
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lecture addressed Indirect Approach strategy topics.  In the absence of these 
notes, the analysis is made only on the available records.  Finally, the data set, of 
only 3 classes, is exceptionally small.  Further detailed analysis of the strategy 
focused content of all the War Colleges’ programs would be required to 
determine the validity of the conclusions drawn from this analysis.  However, this 
analysis is only intended to facilitate a trend analysis of the strategy-focused 
instruction provided each of these officers. 
F.  SUMMARY 
As unfortunate as it is, General Franks’ meager 7% of the strategy 
oriented focus of his War College instruction toward the Indirect Approach was 
the most of any of the three key uniformed military leaders who advised the 
President on a response strategy to the 9/11 attacks.  It is therefore little wonder 
why the strategy presented from the uniformed key leaders of the military to the 
President and National Security Council, at Camp David on 9/15, was entirely a 
Direct Approach solution to an Indirect Approach problem.  The men responsible 
for preparing this solution were all products of an educational system that 
focused on a Direct Approach.  As previously cited, “[a military’s] position in the 
attrition [Direct Approach] / maneuver [Indirect Approach] spectrum is manifest in 
their operational methods, tactics, and organizational arrangements, but 
especially in their methods of officer education.”72  This analysis shows that the 
U.S. military position on Luttwak’s spectrum is firmly, if not wholly, grounded in 
the Direct Approach and the uniformed leaders’ solution on 9/15 is evidence to 
the same conclusion.  As Marshal de Saxe observed, since their professional 
military education left these leaders “in default of knowing what should be done.  
They [did] what they kn[e]w.”73  
 
                                            
72 Luttwak, pp 11-18. NOTE: emphasis added in italics 
73 Marshal de Saxe (1696-1750), cited in “Military Air Power: The Cadre Digest of Air Power 
Opinions and Thoughts”, Compiled by Lt Col Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF, Internet; retrieved 
from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milquote.doc accessed on 26 September 2007. 
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IV. A WAY AHEAD IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 
The purpose of this thesis is captured in the title, “How can the U.S. 
military avoid another 9/15.”  In order to answer this question, the research and 
analysis has pursued three general aspects: 
1. Is there an optimal strategy solution for the U.S. military in asymmetric 
conflicts? 
2. Is the optimal strategy solution a foreign concept in the organizational 
history of the U.S. military? 
3. Were the key players, responsible for the recommendation on 9/15, 
taught the optimal strategy solution in their professional military 
education strategy instruction? 
The research and analysis shows tangible evidence to support the 
following conclusions addressing each of these aspects:  
1. Yes, there is an optimal strategy solution for the U.S. military in 
asymmetric conflicts. 
2. No, situations requiring application of the optimal strategy solution are 
widespread throughout the U.S. military’s organizational operational 
history. 
3. No, the key players, responsible for the recommendation on 9/15, were 
not taught the optimal strategy solution in their professional military 
education strategy instruction.  
The conclusions combine to suggest that the essential requirement of the 
U.S. military, to ensure it avoids another 9/15, is to correct the strategy focus of 
the military education of its officers.  The U.S. military needs an officer corps 
educated in the strategy of both a Direct and Indirect Approach; only then will its 
officers be capable of employing strategies best suited for the type of threat the 
nation faces.        
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A. WHERE DID THE COUP D’OEIL GO? 
In his research, Toft found 202 asymmetric conflicts between 1816 and 
2003, in the more than 4,000 events listed in the Correlates of War dataset.  As 
the sole remaining superpower, the U.S. military should expect to find an 
asymmetric adversary to its operations, for the foreseeable future.  Toft’s 
“strategic interaction theory” orients the strategy of the actors in asymmetric 
conflicts.  The game theory analysis, of Toft’s theory, shows that the optimal 
strategy in asymmetric conflicts is: 
1. To possess an equal capacity to conduct either a Direct Approach 
strategy or Indirect Approach strategy 
2. To compel or allow the adversary to commit the first strategic move 
and respond with the same approach strategy being employed by the 
adversary. 
Four days after the 9/11 attacks, the National Security Council assembled 
at Camp David to develop a strategy for how the United States should respond to 
the 9/11 attacks.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh 
Shelton, presented his recommendation, which was completely focused on a 
Direct Approach.74 
The U.S. military leadership did not recommend the optimal strategy for 
the asymmetric conflict presented by Al Qaeda.  Al Qaeda committed the first 
strategic move, an Indirect Approach strategy, but the response recommended 
was not an Indirect Approach.  General Shelton had operational experience in 
the Indirect Approach means, yet he still called for a Direct Approach focused 
strategy.  His decision is most attributable to the fact that he did not receive equal 
strategy instruction in the Direct and Indirect Approach.  Instead, just as the 
recommendation, he and the other generals with responsibility for the 
recommendation were educated almost exclusively on the Direct Approach.  This 
                                            
74 Woodward, Bob and Dan Balz.  Washington Post, Thursday, January 31, 2002; “10 DAYS 
IN SEPTEMBER: Inside the War Cabinet: At Camp David, Advise and Dissent: Bush, Aides 
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is in spite of the fact that forty years earlier President Kennedy called for, “proper 
recognition throughout the U.S. government that subversive insurgency (‘wars of 
liberation’) [Indirect Approach] is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in 
importance to conventional warfare.”75  The U.S military did not prepare its 
leaders to lead an Indirect Approach fight and, therefore, is not equally capable 
of a Direct or Indirect Approach strategy. 
In his treatise, On War, Carl von Clausewitz utilizes the French phrase 
coup d’oeil, which translates as “a rapid glance.”76  He defines the phrase, in 
terms of strategy, as a military commander’s “quick recognition of a truth which 
for the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and 
reflection.”77  For Clausewitz, coup d’oeil is a significant component of a 
commander’s capacity to develop successful strategy.   
General George Patton is a commander considered to possess an 
impressive coup d’oeil capacity.  Duggan writes, “Patton was famous for his ‘sixth 
sense’ –flashes of insight that showed him his strategy.”78  Patton explained his 
‘sixth sense’ capacity: “For years I have been accused of indulging in snap 
judgments.  Honestly this is not the case because… I am a profound military 
student and the thoughts I express… are the result of years of thought and 
study.”79   
The Patton example implies coup d’oeil is a capacity, which is gained or 
enhanced through the study of military history.  Generals Shelton, Myers, and 
                                            
Grapple with War Plan”. 
75 National Security Memorandum 124, "Establishment of the Special Group (Counter-
Insurgency)," 18 January 1962; cited from The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 
660-661; Internet; retrieved from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc107.htm 
accessed on 5 August 2007 
76 “coup d’oeil” Internet; retrieved from http://www.yourdictionary.com/coup-d-oeil accessed 
on 13 October 2007 
77 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p 102. 
78 William Duggan, Coup D’oeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning, November 2005 
Internet; retrieved from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB631.pdf 
accessed on 13 October 2007, p 5. 
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Franks appear to lack Patton-like coup d’oeil for the modern asymmetric 
battlefield.  Unfortunately, the men responsible for preparing the 9/11 response 
recommendation were all products of an educational system that focused on a 
Direct Approach.   
In his work, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, John Nagl writes: 
As Westmoreland notes in his memoirs, “If an officer progresses 
through the United States Army’s demanding promotion system to 
reach the rank of general, he is, except under most unusual 
circumstances, clearly competent, even if he may not be the best 
man for every assignment, and bad assignments inevitably occur.”  
Vietnam presented Westmoreland and his fellow senior officers 
with just such “most unusual circumstances” – conditions their 
training and experience left them completely unprepared to 
handle.80   
 
Generals Shelton, Myers, and Franks certainly met or exceeded all of 
Westmoreland’s observations of a U.S. military general.  Unfortunately, just as 
the case of Westmoreland in Vietnam, the 9/11 attacks presented Generals 
Shelton, Myers, and Franks with “conditions their training … left them completely 
unprepared to handle.”   
B. INSTRUCTING TOMMOROW’S U.S. MILITARY LEADERS 
If changing the officer strategy education is the solution, the Core 
Curriculum program of instruction for the 2007 National War College Class 
appears to reflect a construct approaching an equal balance between Direct and 
Indirect Approach strategy focus.   The courses with course descriptions from 
The 2007 National War College Student Handbook are presented in Table 4. 
                                            
79 Duggan, p 169. 
80 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002, p 201; citing William Westmoreland, A 
Soldier Reports, New York: Da Capo, 1989, 275. 
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Course name Course Description published in The 2007 National War College Student Handbook 
6100 - Introduction to Strategy This course introduces the elements of strategy, critical thinking and strategic analysis to 
develop and provide the foundational strategic thinking skills required for the balance of the 
curriculum.  Using selected frameworks and examples of strategy, students will begin their 
year-long examination of the components of national security strategy, the assumptions 
behind strategic choices, relationships among the instruments of national power, the 
orchestration of the instruments of power in pursuit of national security objectives and the 
roles of leadership and ethics in national security strategy. 
6200 - War and Statecraft This course analyzes the distinctive, and multi-faceted, phenomenon of war, to include: its 
character, conduct, nature, and scope; its military and non-military dimensions; and the 
ramifications of its use and potential use to achieve political objectives. The course 
explores key concepts regarding war and how those theoretical underpinnings have 
affected the design of military strategy.  In so doing, the course provides students with a 
solid theoretical foundation for developing military strategy. Students will study a 
framework for critiquing—and designing—military strategy that will benefit them in 
subsequent examinations of military issues in other courses, in the end-of-year strategy 
practicum, and in their efforts to develop strategy after graduation. The course further 
examines the elements comprising the military instrument of power and how that instrument 
can be employed in combination with other instruments of statecraft in peace and crisis, as 
well as in war. 
6300 - The Non-Military Elements 
of Strategy 
This course analyzes the non-military tools available to strategists and how those tools flow 
from the broader elements of national power.  Specifically, the course analyzes the nature, 
purposes, capabilities and limitations of the non-military instruments of power, and 
investigates and critiques a variety of ways that strategists use these instruments. The 
course explores how instruments of power differ from but is dependent upon underlying 
national power, particularly in the areas of economics and information. Discussions 
reference peace, crisis and war to provide a comprehensive review of the non-military 
instruments’ role in national security strategy.  The course provides detailed information on 
the non-military tools available to national security strategists, the various uses of those 
tools, both singly and in conjunction with one another, and helps set the stage for the end-
of-year practicum course. 
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6400 - The Domestic Context and 
U.S. National Security Decision-
Making 
This course provides the students with an understanding of the complex reality of the 
domestic context in which American strategists must make decisions. It considers the 
domestic context from multiple perspectives.  It evaluates how broad domestic political and 
cultural factors, as well as resource and economic constraints, affect policy formulation and 
execution. The course further examines the structure and process of U.S. national security 
decisions.  Here the course considers both the historical, philosophical and Constitutional 
foundations of inter-agency and inter-branch processes, and their subsequent evolution 
and current form. One element of this investigation will be a study of American civil military 
relations.  Finally, the course will focus on individual and group level decision-making, to 
include a discussion of individual leadership and legitimate dissent within the U.S. national 
security policy process. 
6500 - The Global Context The purpose of this course is to help students understand the world and emerging strategic 
challenges from a perspective that is not U.S.-centric.  Students will study selected nation-
states and international regions, developing a familiarity with the role played by culture and 
history, as well as the key emerging trends in that region. They will analyze international 
trends and developments, compare and contrast regional contexts and national 
perspectives, and recommend how best to prioritize U.S. interests within and across 
regions.  The course will also examine how non-state actors, transnational actors and 
global trends shape the strategic environment. Students will develop a working knowledge 
of the international security context that is essential for creating, analyzing and carrying out 
national security strategy and policy. 
6600 - Field Studies in National 
Security 
The National War College curriculum focuses on strategy at the national level, to include 
the integration of all elements of national power. It addresses national security policy, the 
theory and practice of war, the domestic and international context of national security 
strategy, contemporary military strategy, and joint and combined warfare. In turn, the policy 
and strategy process takes place in specific political, military, economic, social, 
geographical, and governmental contexts. It is a process that has bilateral, regional, and 
global dimensions. Understanding the formulation and implementation of policy and 
strategy requires in-depth knowledge of the current and prospective foreign policy situation 
in nations and regions affected by U.S. policies, and even more importantly, an 
understanding of how such strategic judgments are formulated. The Field Studies program 
is designed to integrate all the themes of the core courses and meet NWC/JPME objectives 
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by providing a “test bed” for the synthesis of the entire year’s curriculum. These studies 
provide opportunities for NWC students and faculty to discuss policy issues with political, 
military, business, media, and academic leaders of other nations that affect the security of 
their nations and regions as well as the security of the United States. This interaction 
moves NWC strategic education from the theoretical world to the world of reality. There is 
no classroom substitute for the intensive learning that comes from face-to-face exchanges 
and personal experiences gained through discussions and activities overseas. 
6700 - Practicum in National 
Security Strategy 
This capstone course integrates and synthesizes the fundamental themes from the entire 
curriculum. The course will examine a series of strategic national security and homeland 
security challenges confronting the nation today. Students will work in small groups to 
assess select transnational security issues, determine U.S. objectives, identify key 
assumptions, and develop a range of policy options that include evaluations of the risks and 
benefits of each option. Students will practice the critical thinking skills introduced in course 
6100 and select the military instruments (6200) and non military instruments (6300) best 
suited to these security challenges. Each exercise will also require an assessment of key 
domestic and national decision making enablers and constraints (6400) as well as a keen 
appreciation for the global context (6500) in which the U.S. must develop and implement its 
strategy. Students’ experiences from their field studies (6600) will be integrated into a 
program that develops specific regional strategies. In addition, students will have 
researched specific questions during their field studies that will have direct applicability in at 
least two of the challenges considered in this course. In keeping with the goal of “putting 
theory into practice,” students will give oral presentations, field questions from “real world” 
officials, and produce written options memorandum designed for senior decision makers. 
Table 4.   2007 National War College Course Listing 
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The course descriptions are certainly a positive indicator of a greater 
balance between Direct and Indirect Approach strategy foci.  However, there are 
some areas of concern with the curriculum. 
First, General Shelton was a member of the National War College Class of 
1983.  He became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1997, 14 years 
later.  General Myers was a member of the U.S. Army War College Class of 1981 
and didn’t become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until 2001, 20 years 
later.  If the National War College, and the other War Colleges, curriculum is 
producing students with an optimal 50-50 Direct/Indirect Approach strategy 
orientation in the Class of 2007, it will potentially be 2021 to 2027 by the time one 
of these graduates becomes a future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Until 
a member of the Class of 2007 becomes a future Chairman, how will a future 
President know if the recommended strategy is the optimal approach? 
Hy Rothstein, the author of Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of 
Unconventional Warfare, has developed a simple but effective methodology to 
assist in orienting strategy requirements toward either a Direct Approach or 
Indirect Approach.  He bases his methodology on Beaufre’s five example 
patterns of strategy.81  Rothstein has inferred from these examples, and the 
remainder of Beaufre’s text, that determining the appropriate strategy orientation, 
Direct or Indirect, requires answers to only three questions:  
 
1. What is the importance of the objective? (Low, Moderate or High) 
2. Are adequate resources available? (Adequate or Inadequate) 
3. What freedom of action is available to conduct the campaign or 
operation? (Restricted, Limited or Unlimited) 
 
                                            
81 Andre’ Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, translated by Major General R.H. Barry, 
London: Faber & Faber, 1965, pp 26-30. 
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Rothstein contends that if the real answers to these questions are: High, 
Adequate, and Unlimited; a Direct Approach strategy is appropriate.  However, if 
any one of the answers is different, an Indirect Approach strategy of some 
manner or a hybrid Direct and Indirect Approach strategy is required to obtain the 
objective.82  Rothstein does caveat the political capital requirement for an Indirect 
Approach.  He observes that “the more indirect a strategy is the more protracted 
the effort [will be].”83 The genius of this simple methodology is that the answers 
are typically both apparent with a general assessment of a given situation and 
equally indicative of the adversary’s strategy position.   
The next concern about the current National War College curriculum is 
whether this is a temporary correction or is this an actual paradigm shift within 
the military.  The last time the U.S. military engaged in a large-scale Indirect 
Approach environment, the Vietnam War, the organization made sweeping 
changes to its education system.  Counterinsurgency (COIN) was the preeminent 
doctrine and Nagl notes, “many army schools added COIN instruction. The Army 
Cooks and Bakers’ School even added classes on counterinsurgency to its pie-
making classes.”84  The changes, away from a concentration on conventional 
warfare or the Direct Approach, did not last.  Nagl later writes, “The 1976 edition 
of [U.S. Army Field Manual] FM 100-5 Operations… did not mention 
counterinsurgency.”85  Only four years removed from the conflict, the U.S. Army 
did not even consider the formerly preeminent doctrine worthy of noting in its 
primary manual for operations. 
Once again, COIN is the preeminent doctrine and the Indirect Approach is 
receiving a good deal of attention within military circles.  Unfortunately, some 
recent comments from current senior uniformed military officers indicate once 
                                            
82 Hy Rothstein, author’s lecture notes from presentations at the Naval Post Graduate 
School, August 2007. 
83 Hy Rothstein, correspondence with the author in an e-mail entitled “RE: A Question” on 31 
October 2007. 
84 Nagl, p 125. 
85 Nagl, p 206. 
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again the interest may wane, as soon as possible.  Recently, the Commander, 
General Lance Smith, of U.S. Joint Forces Command, the U.S. military 
organization responsible for among other things preparing joint military doctrine, 
was quoted as saying: 
And the danger now, of course, is we get so focused on 
counterinsurgency and irregular warfare that we are not prepared 
for a different kind of war, … Whether that is major conventional 
war or . . . a hybrid of large conventional war and irregular war.86 
The historical probability, from this analysis, is that it is 110 times more 
likely the U.S. military’s optimal strategy will be an Indirect Approach.  
Additionally, is there a better way to be prepared for “a hybrid of large 
conventional war and irregular war” than to have a balanced Direct/Indirect 
Approach strategy focus?   
George Santayana once observed, “In a moving world, readaptation is the 
price of longevity.”87  President Kennedy accurately informed the West Point 
graduating Class of 1962 of the requirements for readaptation in the U.S. military: 
This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins 
– war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by 
ambush instead of combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression,  
seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of 
engaging him.  It requires in those situations where we must 
counter it… a whole new kind of strategy…88 
                                            
86 “AF Gen yearns for conventional warfare” Inside the Pentagon, October 18, 2007; 
Internet; retrieved from 
http://uscavonpoint.com/blogs/reconstructing_iraq/archive/2007/10/19/7073.aspx accessed on 31 
October 2007. 
87 George Santayana (1863-1952, American Philosopher, Poet), Internet; retrieved from 
http://www.cybernation.com/quotationcenter/quoteshow.php?id=19567 accessed on 31 October 
2007. 
88 John F. Kennedy, Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military 
Academy, 6 June  1962, Internet; retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu 
/ws/index.php?pid=8695 accessed on 31 October 2007.   
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Until the U.S. military accepts the requirement for readaptation, future 
Presidents will be forced to seek strategy advice from people other than their 
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APPENDIX A: GAME THEORY CALCULATIONS 
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APPENDIX B: U.S. MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS AND OPERATIONS, 1947 – 2001  




1 New Horizons Military civic action and Humanitarian 
Assistance missions abroad 
Central America 2001 Present I 
2 Essential Harvest Support to NATO collection of arms and 
ammunition in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
Macedonia 27-Aug-01 1-Oct-01 I 
3 Focus Relief Provide military training and equipment to 
prepare the African battalions for 
peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone 
Ghana & Senegal May-01 Aug-01 I 
4 Desert Shift Force protection initiative for U.S. forces 
based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia Nov-00 Dec-03 I 
5 Determined Response U.S. response to the terrorist attack on the 
destroyer USS Cole  
Anti-terror Operations 12-Oct-00 Present I 
6 Sierra Leone NEO Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens 
Sierra Leone May-00 May-00 I 
7 Silent Promise / Atlas 
Response 
Military humanitarian relief effort following 
torrential rains and flooding in southern 
Mozambique and South Africa 
Mozambique / South Africa Feb-00 Apr-00 I 
8 Fundamental Response Military humanitarian relief effort following 
flash flooding in northern Venezuela  
Venezuela 20-Dec-99 early 2000 I 
9 Stabilize Military support to the International Force 
in East Timor, or INTERFET 
Timor 11-Sep-99 Nov-99 I 
10 Joint Guardian U.S. military support to NATO 
peacekeeping mission 
Kosovo 11-Jun-99 Present I 
11 Shining Presence Military show of force to augment Israeli air 
and theater missile defense capabilities 
Israel Dec-98 Dec-98 I 
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12 Eagle Eye U.S. support to NATO-Kosovo Verification 
Mission Agreement; non-combatant aerial 
reconnaissance 
16-Oct-98 24-Mar-99 I 
13 Determined Force 8-Oct-98 23-Mar-99 I 
14 Allied Force / Noble Anvil 
U.S./NATO air strikes against Serbian 
military targets in the Former Yugoslavia 
Kosovo 
23-Mar-99 10-Jun-99 I 
15 Strong Support [Fuerte 
Apoyo] 
Military humanitarian relief effort in Central 
America in response to the disaster 
caused by Hurricane Mitch 
Central America Oct-98 10-Feb-99 I 
16 Infinite Reach Military strikes against terrorist facilities in 
Afghanistan and Sudan; U.S. response to 
the terrorist attack on embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania  
Sudan / Afghanistan 20-Aug-98 20-Aug-98 I 
17 Resolute Response Military recovery, rescue, support, and 
security efforts in response to the terrorists 
attack on embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania 
Africa 7-Aug-98 31-Aug-99 I 
18 Avid Response Military humanitarian relief effort following 
the earthquake that hit Western Turkey  
Turkey 18-Aug-99 Sep-99 I 
19 Albania Military security operations Tirana, Albania 16-Aug-98 Sep-98   
20 Shining Hope  Military foreign humanitarian assistance 
operations in support of Kosovar refugees 
I 
21 Sustain Hope / Allied 
Harbour 
Military humanitarian relief effort to bring in 
food, water, medicine and relief supplies for the 
refugees fleeing from the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia into Albania and Macedonia 
I 
22 Provide Refuge / Open 
Arms 
Military airlift as many as 20,000 Kosovo 
refugees to safety in the United States 
until they can return to their homes 
Kosovo 5-Apr-99 Fall 1999 
I 
23 Determined Falcon U.S./NATO air show of force over Former 
Yugoslavia 
Kosovo & Albania 15-Jun-98 16-Jun-98 I 
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24 Shepherd Venture Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens 
Guinea-Bissau 10-Jun-98 17-Jun-98 I 
25 Safe Departure Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens 
Asmara, Eritrea NEO 5-Jun-98 6-Jun-98 I 
26 Bevel Incline Military deployment in preparation to 
support the evacuation of U.S. citizens; 
evacuation was never ordered 
Indonesia May-98 May-98 I 
27 Noble Response Military humanitarian relief effort following 
rains and flooding in the northeastern part 
of Kenya 
Kenya 21-Jan-98 25-Mar-98 I 
28 Plan Colombia U.S. support to the Colombian military and the 
National Police 
Colombia 1998 Present I 
29 Silent Assurance Military operations to enhance security for U.S. 
citizens and facilities during the Middle 
East/North Africa (MENA) Economic 
Conference 
Saudi Arabia Nov-97 Nov-97 I 
30 Phoenix Scorpion I  Nov-97 Nov-97 I 
31 Phoenix Scorpion II Feb-98 Feb-98 I 
32 Phoenix Scorpion III Nov-98 Nov-98 I 
33 Phoenix Scorpion IV 
Military show of force in response to Iraq’s 
defiance to United Nations weapons 
inspections 
Iraq 
Dec-98 Dec-98 I 
34 Bevel Edge Military deployment in preparation to 
support the evacuation of U.S. citizens; 
evacuation was never ordered 
Cambodia Jul-97 Jul-97 I 
35 Noble Obelisk Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens 
Sierra Leone May-97 Jun-97 I 
36 Guardian Retrieval Military humanitarian assistance operations in 
support of Rwandan refugees 
Congo (formerly Zaire) Mar-97 Jun-97 I 
37 Silver Wake Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens 
Albania 14-Mar-97 26-Mar-97 I 
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38 Assured Lift Military airlift and other logistical support to 
Economic Community Military Observation 
Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping mission 
in Liberia 
Liberia 18-Feb-97 7-Mar-97 I 
39 Present Haven Military support for Guyanese refugees Guantanamo Bay Feb-97 Feb-97 I 
40 Relief Focus Provide military training and equipment to 
prepare the African battalions for 
peacekeeping operations  
Africa 1997 Present I 
41 Guardian Assistance U.S. non-combatant aerial reconnaissance 
of situation in Rwanda 
I 
42 Assurance / Phoenix Tusk  Military humanitarian assistance operations in 
support of Rwandan refugees 
Zaire/Rwanda/Uganda 15-Nov-96 27-Dec-96
I 
43 Desert Focus Military restructuring of forces on Arabian 
Peninsula in response terrorist bombing at 
Khobar Towers  
Saudi Arabia Nov-96 Nov-00 I 
44 Pacific Haven / Quick 
Transit 
Military support to evacuation of pro-U.S. 
Kurds from northern Iraq to Guam 
Iraq > Guam 15-Sep-96 16-Dec-96 I 
45 DESERT STRIKE Military strikes on military targets posing a 
threat to coalition aircraft in the Northern Iraq 
no-fly-zone 
3-Sep-96 4-Sep-96 I 
46 DESERT THUNDER U.S. effort to provide military presence and 
capability during negotiations between the 
UN and Iraq over weapons of mass 
destruction 
Iraq 
Feb-98 16-Dec-98 I 
47 DESERT FOX Military strikes in response to Iraq's 
continued failure to comply with United 
Nations Security Council resolutions as 
well as their interference with United 
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) 
inspectors 
Iraq 16-Dec-98 20-Dec-98 I 
48 Quick Response Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens 
Central African Republic  May-96 Aug-96 I 
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49 Assured Response Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens 
Liberia Apr-96 Aug-96 I 
50 Laser Strike Military support to multiple counterdrug 
operations involving all 19 Latin American 
countries; supersedes Operation Green Clover 
South America Apr-96 Present I 
51 Nomad Endeavor / Nomad 
Vigil 
U.S. non-combatant aerial reconnaissance 
support to NATO 
Taszar, Hungary Mar-96 5-Nov-96 I 
52 Marathon Military support to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Services (INS) to stop illegal 
smuggling of migrants by ship into the 
United States 
Atlantic Ocean 1996 1996 I 
53 Full Accounting Military operations to recover remains of 
personnel lost in previous conflicts in 
Southeast Asia 
Southeast Asia Oct-95 Present I 
54 DELIBERATE FORCE U.S./NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb 
military targets in the Former Yugoslavia 
Bosnian Serbs 29-Aug-95 21-Sep-95 I 
55 Third Taiwan Straits Crisis U.S. show of force in response to China 
missile firing 
Taiwan Strait 21-Jul-95 23-Mar-96 I 
56 Operation Marathon Pacific 
/ Operation Prompt Return 
Military support in the repatriation of 
Chinese migrants  
Wake Island 3-Jul-95 10-Aug-95 I 
57 Quick Lift  Military support to the United Nations 
mission and allies in the former Republic 
of Yugoslavia 
Croatia 3-Jul-95 11-Aug-95 I 
58 Joint Endeavor Military ground forces deployment to 
implement the military elements of the 
Dayton Peace Accords; forces were the 
Implementation Force (IFOR) 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  Dec-95 Dec-96 I 
59 Zorro II Military operations in support of the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) and other law 
enforcement elements 
U.S. Southwest Border Dec-95 2-May-96 I 
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60 Joint Guard Military ground forces deployment to 
implement the military elements of the 
Dayton Peace Accords; forces were the 
Stabilization Force (SFOR); superseded 
Operation Joint Endeavor 
Dec-96 20-Jun-98 I 
61 Joint Forge  Reduced military ground forces 
deployment to implement the military 
elements of the Dayton Peace Accords; 
superseded Operation Joint Guard 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  
20-Jun-98 24-Nov-04 I 
62 UNMIH, USFORHAITI; 
USSPTGP-HAITI 
Military Humanitarian Assistance and 
security operations 
Haiti 1-Apr-95 31-Jan-00 I 
63 United Shield Military support in the final withdrawal of 
United Nations peacekeeping troops from 
Somalia 
Somalia 3-Jan-95 25-Mar-95 I 
64 Safe Border Military support in the peaceful settlement 
of the border dispute between Peru and 
Ecuador  
Peru / Ecuador 1995 30-Jun-99 I 
65 Gatekeeper California 1995 Present I 
66 Hold-the-Line Texas 1995 Present I 
67 Safeguard 
Military support to the INS and other law 
enforcement elements with border control 
operations designed to prevent illegal 
border crossings 
Arizona 1995 Present I 
68 Selva Verde Military support to DEA operations with 
Columbian counter-narcotics operations  
Colombia 1995 Present I 
69 Vigilant Warrior Oct-94 Nov-94 I 
70 Vigilant Sentinel 
U.S. show of force in response Iraqi force 
movements Aug-95 15-Feb-97 I 
71 Intrinsic Action Military nearly continuous presence of a U.S. 
battalion task force in Kuwait to deter further 
aggression by Iraq 
1-Dec-95 1-Oct-99 I 
72 Desert Spring  Military maintenance of a forward presence to 
provide control and force protection over Army 
forces in Kuwait 
Kuwait 
1-Oct-99 Present I 
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73 Uphold/Restore Democracy Military movement of forces to Haiti to 
support the return of Haitian democracy 
Haiti 19-Sep-94 31-Mar-95 I 
74 Quiet Resolve / Support 
Hope 
Military humanitarian relief operations in 
Rwanda 
Rwanda 22-Jul-94 30-Sep-94 I 
75 Able Sentry U.S. support for the United Nations Preventive 
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), tasked to 
monitor and report activity along the 
Macedonia/Serbia border area 
Serbia-Macedonia 5-Jul-94 28-Feb-99 I 
76 Safe Haven / Safe Passage Military support in the repatriation of Cuban 
migrants 
Cuba > Panama 6-Sep-94 1-Mar-95 I 
77 Sea Signal / JTF-160 Military support for 50,000 Haitian and Cuban 
migrants seeking asylum in the United States 
Haiti > Guantanamo, Cuba 18-May-94 Feb-96 I 
78 Able Vigil Able Manner Military response to two mass migrations at the 
same time -- first from Haiti, then from Cuba, off 
the coast of Florida; Coast Guard operation 
(then a component of DoD) 
Cuba 19-Aug-94 23-Sep-94 I 
79 Quick Draw Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens 
Somalia Jun-94 Sep-94 I 
80 Distant Runner Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens 
Rwanda NEO 9-Apr-94 15-Apr-94 I 
81 Steady State Military support to multiple counterdrug 
operations 
South America 1994 Apr-96 I 
82 Green Clover Military support to multiple counterdrug 
operations involving Peru and Colombia; 
superseded by Operation Laser Strike 
South America 1994 Apr-96 I 
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83 Deny Flight U.S./NATO air elements enforced the no-fly 
zone, provided close air support to UN troops, 
and conducted approved air strikes  
12-Apr-93 20-Dec-95 I 
84 Decisive Endeavor / 
Decisive Edge 
U.S./NATO air elements transitioned from 
Operation Deny Flight in support of the IFOR 
Operation Joint Endeavor 
Jan-96 Dec-96 I 
85 Decisive Guard / Deliberate 
Guard 
U.S./NATO air elements transitioned from 
Operation Decisive Edge in support of the 
SFOR Operation Joint Guard 
Dec-96 20-Jun-98 I 
86 Deliberate Forge  U.S./NATO air elements transitioned from 
Operation Deliberate Guard in support of the 
reduced forces conducting Operation Joint 
Forge 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
20-Jun-98 24-Nov-04 I 
87 Korean Nuclear Crisis  U.S. show of force in response to North 
Korean defiance of UN nuclear reactor 
talks 
North Korea 10-Feb-93 Jun-94 I 
88 Iris Gold Military security assistance to train and assist 
Kuwaiti military units 
SW Asia 1993 Present I 
89 Liberian NEO Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens 
Liberian NEO 22-Oct-92 25-Oct-92 I 
90 Sky Monitor U.S./NATO enforcement of UN directed ban on 
military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 16-Oct-92 24-Nov-04 I 
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91 Provide Relief Military humanitarian assistance 
operations in Somalia 
14-Aug-92 8-Dec-92 I 
92 Restore Hope  U.S. military led coalition with mandate of 
protecting humanitarian operations and creating 
a secure environment for eventual political 
reconciliation 
4-Dec-92 4-May-93 I 
93 Continue Hope U.S. military support of UNOSOM II to 
establish a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations by providing 
personnel, logistical, communications, 
intelligence support, a quick reaction force, 
and other elements as required 
Somalia 
4-May-93 Mar-94 I 
94 Provide Transition U.S. military support for multinational United 
Nations effort to support democratic elections 
following 16 years of civil war in Angola 
Angola 3-Aug-92 9-Oct-92 I 
95 Maritime Monitor U.S./NATO support for the monitoring of 
sanctions mandated by the UNSCR 713 
and 757 in international waters off the 
Montenegro coast  
16-Jul-92 22-Nov-92 I 
96 Maritime Guard 22-Nov-92 15-Jun-93 I 
97 Sharp Guard 15-Jun-93 Dec-95 I 
98 Decisive Enhancement Dec-95 19-Jun-96 I 
99 Determined Guard 
U.S./NATO support for enforcing the UN 
embargoes in the former Yugoslavia 
Adriatic Sea 
Dec-96 Dec-98 I 
100 Provide Promise U.S./NATO support for the UN mandated 
deployment of peacekeeping forces and 
humanitarian relief operations 
Bosnia 3-Jul-92 Mar-96 I 
101 Garden Plot Military support related to domestic civil 
disturbances 
Los Angeles, CA May-92 May-92 I 
102 Silver Anvil  Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens 
Sierra Leone NEO 2-May-92 5-May-92 I 
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103 Provide Hope I 10-Feb-92 26-Feb-92 I 
104 Provide Hope II 15-Apr-92 29-Jul-92 I 
105 Provide Hope III 1993 1993 I 
106 Provide Hope IV 10-Jan-94 19-Dec-94 I 
107 Provide Hope V  
Military humanitarian assistance operation 
to provide excess supplies and medical 
equipment to the former Soviet republics 
during their transition to democratic and 
free market states 
Former Soviet Union 
6-Nov-98 10-May-99 I 
108 GTMO / Safe Harbor Military humanitarian assistance to 
receive, transport, detain, control and 
process Haitian migrants 
Haiti > Guantanamo, Cuba 23-Nov-91 Jun-93 I 
109 Quick Lift Military support for the deployment of 
French and Belgian troops to Zaire and 
evacuation of 716 people  
Zaire 24-Sep-91 7-Oct-91 I 
110 Victor Squared Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens 
Haiti NEO Sep-91   I 
111 Fiery Vigil Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens following the eruption of Mount 
Pinatubo 
Philippines NEO Jun-91   I 
112 Productive Effort / Sea 
Angel 
Military humanitarian relief effort in the wake of 
the destruction of the tropical cyclone Marian 
Bangladesh May-91 Jun-91 I 
113 Provide Comfort 5-Apr-91 Dec-94 I 
114 Provide Comfort II 
Military humanitarian assistance in the 
delivery of supplies to Kurds in N. Iraq 24-Jul-91 31-Dec-96 I 
115 Northern Watch  U.S. military support to coalition 
establishment of a no-fly zone over N. Iraq
Kurdistan 
31-Dec-96 17-Mar-03 I 
116 Eastern Exit Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens 
Somalia 2-Jan-91 11-Jan-91 I 
117 Desert Falcon Military show of force to augment Saudi air 
and theater missile defense capabilities 
Saudi Arabia 1991 Dec-03 I 
118 Maritime Interception 
Operations 
Military support for the enforcement of the 
UN mandated arms and then smuggling 
embargo 
Persian Gulf 1991 1-May-03 I 
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119 Southern Watch  U.S. military support to coalition 
establishment of a no-fly zone over S. Iraq
Southwest Asia / Iraq 1991 17-Mar-03 I 
120 Support Justice Military support for counter-narcotics 
operations 
South America 1991 1994 I 
121 Desert Shield Military deployment in response to Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait 
Southwest Asia 2-Aug-90 17-Jan-91 I 
122 DESERT STORM Military operations to remove Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait 
17-Jan-91 28-Feb-91 D 
123 Positive Force Military show of force operation in Kuwait 
to deter further Iraqi aggression 
Southwest Asia 
Summer 91 Summer 
91 
I 
124 Desert Calm / Desert 
Farewell 
Military redeployment of forces from 
Operation Desert Storm 
Southwest Asia 1-Mar-91 1-Jan-92 I 
125 Coronet Nighthawk Military counter-narcotics air interdiction 
operations 
Central/South America 1991 present I 
126 Sharp Edge Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens and Humanitarian Assistance 
Liberia May-90 8-Jan-91 I 
127 JUST CAUSE U.S. invasion to remove President Manuel 
Noreiga 
20-Dec-89 31-Jan-90 I 
128 Promote Liberty Military security assistance to the PDF 
following Operation Just Cause 
Panama 
31-Jan-90 ?? I 
129 Classic Resolve U.S. show of force operations to deter 
rebel coup attempt 
Philippines  Nov-89 Dec-89 I 
130 Hawkeye Military humanitarian relief effort following 
Hurricane Hugo 
St. Croix, U.S. Virgin 
Islands 
20-Sep-89 17-Nov-89 I 
131 Constant Vigil Military support for counter-narcotics 
operations 
Bolivia 15-Sep-89 ?? I 
132 Furtive Bear Military aerial reconnaissance support for 
counter-narcotics operations 
Peru 15-Sep-89 ?? I 
133 Nimrod Dancer Military show of force operations to insure 
U.S. guaranteed rights under the Panama 
Canal Treaty   
Panama May-89 20-Dec-89 I 
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134 Green Merchant CONUS 1989 1989 I 
135 Agate Path / Enhanced 
Ops 
Military support for counter-narcotics 
operations CONUS 1989 Present I 
136 ERNEST WILL Military escort of escorting re-flagged 
Kuwaiti tankers to deter Iranian aggression
24-Jul-87 2-Aug-90 I 
137 PRAYING MANTIS Military attacks on Iranian targets in 
response to the USS Samuel B. Roberts 
striking an Iranian mine  
Persian Gulf 
17-Apr-88 19-Apr-88 I 
138 Golden Pheasant Military show of force operations to 
counter Nicaraguan incursions into 
Honduras 
Honduras Mar-88 Present I 
139 Blast Furnace Military support for counter-narcotics 
operations 
Bolivia Jul-86 Nov-86 I 
140 EL DORADO CANYON Military air strikes in response to Libyan 
state sponsorship of terrorism 
Libya 12-Apr-86 17-Apr-86 I 
141 Attain Document  Military Freedom of Navigation operations 
into the Gulf of Sidra 
Libya 26-Jan-86 29-Mar-86 I 
142 Alliance U.S. Southern border 1986 Present I 
143 Ghost Dancer Oregon 1990 Present? I 
144 Grizzly California 1990 Present? I 
145 Wipeout 
Military support for counter-narcotics 
operations 
Hawaii 1990 Present I 
146 Greensweep 200 active-duty military troops conducted a 
massive marijuana eradication operation 
California Jul-90 Aug-90 I 
147 Achille Lauro Military operations to detain Palestine 
Liberation Organization terrorists who had 
high jacked the passenger liner 
Mediterranean 7-Oct-85 11-Oct-85 I 
148 Intense Look Military Freedom of Navigation and mine 
countermeasure operations  
Red Sea / Gulf of Suez Jul-84 Jul-84 I 
149 URGENT FURY U.S. invasion to oust the People's 
Revolutionary Government, to protect U.S. 
citizens and restore the lawful government
Grenada 23-Oct-83 21-Nov-83 I 
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150 Arid Farmer Military aerial reconnaissance of the conflict on 
the region between Libya and Sudan 
Chad / Sudan Aug-83 Aug-83 I 
151 Early Call Military aerial reconnaissance of the 
conflict on the region between Libya and 
Sudan 
Egypt / Sudan 18-Mar-83 Aug-83 I 
152 U.S. Multinational Force 
[USMNF]  
Military peacekeeping operations Lebanon 25-Aug-82 1-Dec-87 I 
153 Multinational Force and 
Observers 
Military peacekeeping operations Sinai 1982 ongoing I 
154 Bright Star Military aerial reconnaissance of the conflict on 
the region between Libya and Sudan; in 
response to the assignation of Egyptian 
President Sadat 
Egypt 6-Oct-81 Nov-81 I 
155 Gulf of Sidra Military Freedom of Navigation operations 
into the Gulf of Sidra 
Libya / Mediterranean 18-Aug-81 18-Aug-81 I 
156 Central America Military show of force operations to deter 
Nicaraguan aggression toward El Salvador
El Salvador / Nicaragua 1-Jan-81 1-Feb-92 I 
157 Creek Sentry Military aerial reconnaissance of tensions on 
the Poland Russia border 
Poland Dec-80 1981 I 
158 EAGLE CLAW / Evening 
Light / Desert One 
Military attempted rescue of hostages in 
the U.S. Embassy in Tehran 
Iran 25-Apr-80   I 
159 Mariel Boatlift Military interdiction of illegal Cuban 
migrants; primarily a Coast Guard 
operation (then a component of DoD) 
Cuba 15-Apr-80 31-Oct-80 I 
160 ROK Park Succession 
Crisis 
Military show of force operations to deter N. 
Korean aggression; in response to the 
assignation of S. Korean President Park 
Korea 26-Oct-79 28-Jun-80 I 
161 Elf One Military aerial reconnaissance of the conflict on 
the region between N. and S. Yemen and then 
the Iran/Iraq War 
Saudi Arabia Mar-79 15-Apr-89 I 
162 Yemen Military show of force operation to deter 
escalation of the N. and S. Yemen conflict
Iran/Yemen/Indian Ocean 6-Dec-78 6-Jan-79 I 
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163 Red Bean Military humanitarian assistance and allied 
and non-combatant evacuation 
Zaire May-78 Jun-78 I 
164 Ogaden Crisis Military show of force operation to deter 
further Soviet involvement in the conflict 
between Somalia and Ethiopia 
Somalia / Ethiopia Feb-78 23-Mar-78 I 
165 Coronet Oak  Military aerial counter-narcotics support 
operations 
Central/South America Oct-77 17-Feb-99 I 
166 Paul Bunyan / Tree Incident Military show of force operation to deter N. 
Korean aggression 
Korea 18-Aug-76 21-Aug-76 I 
167 Mayaguez Operation Military attempted rescue of hostages from 
the Mayaguez, a U.S. flagged merchant 
vessel 
Cambodia 15-May-75   I 
168 New Life Military non-combatant evacuation Vietnam NEO Apr-75   I 
169 Frequent Wind Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens and non-combatants 
Evacuation of Saigon 29-Apr-75 30-Apr-75 I 
170 Eagle Pull Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens and non-combatants 
Cambodia 11-Apr-75 13-Apr-75 I 
171 Nimbus Stream Military counter-mine operations in 
Mediterranean  
Egypt Jul-75 Oct-75 I 
172 Nimbus Star / Nimbus 
Moon 
Military counter-mine operations in the 
Suez Canal  
Suez Canal May-74 Dec-74 I 
173 Lebanon NEO Military non-combatant evacuation Lebanon 22-Jul-74 23-Jul-74   
174 Cyprus NEO Military non-combatant evacuation Cyprus 1974     
175 Nickel Grass Military logistical support for Israel in the 
Yom Kippur War 
Mideast 6-Oct-73 17-Nov-73 I 
176 Cambodia Incursion Military invasion to destroy Communist 
sanctuaries 
Cambodia 30-Apr-70 30-Jun-70   
177 Garden Plot Military response to civil disturbances; civil 
reaction to the U.S. invasion of Cambodia 
USA Domestic 30-Apr-70 4-May-70 I 
178 Graphic Hand Military support to the U.S. Postal Service; 
in response to a postal carrier strike 
U.S. Domestic 1970 1970 I 
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179 Red Fox [Pueblo incident] Military show of force operations to deter 
N. Korean aggression; in response to the 
seizure of the USS Pueblo by N. Korea 
Korea theater 23-Jan-68 5-Feb-69 I 
180 Six Day War Military show of force operations to deter 
further Egyptian and Syrian aggression 
toward Israel 
Mideast 13-May-67 10-Jun-67 I 
181 Congo Military logistical support for embattled 
government 
Congo 1967     
182 Powerpack Military show of force operation in civil war Dominican Republic 28-Apr-65 21-Sep-66 I 
183 Red Dragon U.S. transport support for Belgian hostage 
rescue operation 
Congo 23-Nov-64 27-Nov-64 I 
184 Panama Canal Riots Military security operations Panama 1964 1964 I 
185 Cuban Missile Crisis  Military show of force operations to deter 
Soviet support for Cuba 
Cuba, Worldwide 24-Oct-62 1-Jun-63 I 
186 Thailand Military show of force operations to deter 
Communist pressure 
Thailand 17-May-62 30-Jul-62   
187 Vietnam War Military security assistance and combat 
operations to deter N. Vietnam aggression
15-Mar-62 28-Jan-73 I 
188 Operation Ranch Hand Military support for defoliation operations Jan-62 1971 I 
189 Operation Rolling Thunder U.S. bombing campaign 
Vietnam 
24-Feb-65 Oct-68 I 
190 Operation Arc Light U.S. bombing operations Southeast Asia 18-Jun-65 Feb-72 I 
191 Operation Tailwind  Military reconnaissance operations Laos  1970 1970 I 
192 Operation Ivory Coast / 
Kingpin  
Military attempted rescue of American 
POWs in N Vietnam 
North Vietnam (Son Tay 
Raid) 
21-Nov-70 21-Nov-70 I 
193 Operation Bullet Shot U.S. bombing campaign Southeast Asia Feb-72 Dec-72 I 
194 Operation Freedom Train / 
Linbacker I 
U.S. bombing campaign 6-Apr-72 23-Oct-72 I 
195 Operation Pocket Money Military aerial mining of Haiphong harbor 9-May-72 23-Oct-72 I 
196 Operation Linebacker II U.S. bombing campaign 
North Vietnam 
18-Dec-72 29-Dec-72 I 
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197 Operation Endsweep  Military counter-mine measure to remove 
mines dropped during Operation Pocket 
Money 
North Vietnam 27-Jan-72 27-Jul-73 I 
198 Berlin Military show of force and humanitarian 
assistance operations 
Berlin 14-Aug-61 1-Jun-63 I 
199 Laos Military security assistance operations Laos 19-Apr-61 7-Oct-62 I 
200 New Tape Military humanitarian assistance 
operations 
Congo 14-Jul-60 Jan-64 I 





202 Taiwan Straits Military shoe of force operations to deter 
China aggression 
Taiwan Straits / Quemoy 
and Matsu Islands 
23-Aug-58 1-Jan-59 I 
203 Blue Bat Military show of force operations Lebanon 15-Jul-58 20-Oct-58 I 
204 Suez Crisis Military show of force operations Egypt 26-Jul-56 15-Nov-56 I 
205 Taiwan Straits Military shoe of force operations to deter 
China aggression 
Taiwan Straits 11-Aug-54 1-Jun-63 I 
206 Korean War Military operations to remove N. Korean 
forces from S Korea 
Korea 27-Jun-50 27-Jul-53 D 
207 Berlin Airlift Military Humanitarian Assistance 
operations 
Allied Sector, Berlin 
24-Jun-48 May-49 
I 
208 China Military support for the evacuation of U.S. 




209 Palestine Military security operations Palestine 1948   I 
210 Cold War  Military show of force operations to deter 
Soviet aggression 
Worldwide 2-Sep-45 26-Dec-91 I 
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